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Abstract
In this work, we study trade-offs between accuracy and privacy in the context of linear queries over
histograms. This is a rich class of queries that includes contingency tables and range queries, and has been a
focus of a long line of work [BLR08,RR10,DRV10,HT10,HR10,LHR+10,BDKT12]. For a given set of d linear
queries over a database x ∈ RN , we seek to find the differentially private mechanism that has the minimum
mean squared error. For pure differential privacy, [HT10, BDKT12] give an O(log2 d) approximation to the
optimal mechanism. Our first contribution is to give an O(log2 d) approximation guarantee for the case of
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. Our mechanism is simple, efficient and adds carefully chosen correlated Gaussian
noise to the answers. We prove its approximation guarantee relative to the hereditary discrepancy lower bound
of [MN12], using tools from convex geometry.
We next consider this question in the case when the number of queries exceeds the number of individuals
in the database, i.e. when d > n , ‖x‖1. The lower bounds used in the previous approximation algorithm no
longer apply, and in fact better mechanisms are known in this setting [BLR08,RR10,HR10,GHRU11,GRU12].
Our second main contribution is to give an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism that for a given query set A
and an upper bound n on ‖x‖1, has mean squared error within polylog(d,N) of the optimal for A and n. This
approximation is achieved by coupling the Gaussian noise addition approach with linear regression over the
`1 ball. Additionally, we show a similar polylogarithmic approximation guarantee for the best ε-differentially
private mechanism in this sparse setting. Our work also shows that for arbitrary counting queries, i.e. A with
entries in {0, 1}, there is an ε-differentially private mechanism with expected error O˜(√n) per query, improving
on the O˜(n
2
3 ) bound of [BLR08], and matching the lower bound implied by [DN03] up to logarithmic factors.
The connection between hereditary discrepancy and the privacy mechanism enables us to derive the first
polylogarithmic approximation to the hereditary discrepancy of a matrix A.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [DMNS06] is a recent privacy definition that has quickly become the standard notion of privacy
in statistical databases. Informally, a mechanism (a randomized function on databases) satisfies differential privacy
if the distribution of the outcome of the mechanism does not change noticeably when one individual’s input to the
database is changed. Privacy is measured by how small this change must be: an ε-differentially private (ε-DP)
mechanism M satisfies Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[M(x′) ∈ S] for any pair x, x′ of neighboring databases, and
for any measurable subset S of the range. A relaxation of this definition is approximate differential privacy. A
mechanism M is (ε, δ)-differentially private ((ε, δ)-DP) if Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[M(x′) ∈ S] + δ with x, x′, S
as before. Here δ is thought of as negligible in the size of the database. Both these definitions satisfy several
desirable properties such as composability, and are resistant to post-processing of the output of the mechanism.
In recent years, a large body of research has shown that this strong privacy definition still allows for very accurate
analyses of statistical databases. At the same time, answering a large number of adversarially chosen queries
accurately is inherently impossible with any semblance of privacy. Indeed Dinur and Nissim [DN03] show that
answering O˜(d) random subset sums (O˜ hides polylogarithmic factors in N, d, 1/δ.) of a set of d bits with
(per query) error o(
√
d) allows an attacker to reconstruct (an arbitrarily good approximation to) all the private
information. Thus there is an inherent trade-off between privacy and accuracy when answering a large number of
queries. In this work, we study this trade-off in the context of counting queries, and more generally linear queries.
We think of the database as being given by a multiset of database rows, one for each individual. We will let N
denote the size of the universe that these rows come from, and we will denote by n the number of individuals in
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the database. We can represent the database as its histogram x ∈ RN with xi denoting the number of occurrences
of the ith element of the universe. Thus x would in fact be a vector of non-negative integers with ‖x‖1 = n. We
will be concerned with reporting reasonably accurate answers to a given set of d linear queries over this histogram
x. This set of queries can naturally be represented by a matrix A ∈ Rd×N with the vector Ax ∈ Rd giving the
correct answers to the queries. When A ∈ {0, 1}d×N , we call such queries counting queries. We are interested in
the (practical) regime where N  d n, although our results hold for all settings of the parameters.
A differentially private mechanism will return a noisy answer to the query A and, in this work, we measure the
performance of the mechanisms in terms of its worst case total expected squared error. Suppose that X ⊆ RN is
the set of all possible databases. The error of a mechanism M is defined as errM(A,X) = maxx∈X E[‖M(x) −
Ax‖22]. Here the expectation is taken over the internal coin tosses of the mechanism itself, and we look at the
worst case of this expected squared error over all the databases in X. Unless stated otherwise, the error of
the mechanism will refer to this worst case expected `22 error. Phrased thus, the Gaussian noise mechanism of
Dwork et al. [DKM+06a] gives error at most O(d2) for any counting query and guarantees (ε, δ)-DP1 over all
the databases, i.e. X = RN . Moreover, the aforementioned lower bounds imply that there exist counting queries
for which this bound can not be improved. For ε-DP, Hardt and Talwar [HT10] gave a mechanism with error
O(d2 log Nd ) and showed that this is the best possible for random counting queries. Thus the worst case accuracy
for counting queries is fairly well-understood in this measure.
Specific sets of counting queries of interest can however admit much better mechanisms than adversarially chosen
queries for which the lower bounds are shown. Indeed several classes of specific queries have attracted attention.
Some, such as range queries, are “easier”, and asymptotically better mechanisms can be designed for them.
Others, such as constant dimensional contingency tables, are nearly as hard as general counting queries, and
asymptotically better mechanisms can be ruled out in some ranges of the parameters. These query-specific upper
bounds are usually proved by carefully exploiting the structure of the query, and query-specific lower bounds
have been proved by reconstruction attacks that exploit a lower bound on the smallest singular value of an
appropriately chosen A [DN03, DMT07, DY08, KRSU10, De12, KRS13]. It is natural to address this question in
a competitive analysis framework: can we design an efficient algorithm that given any query A, computes (even
approximately) the minimum error differentially private mechanism for A?
Hardt and Talwar [HT10] answered this question in the affirmative for ε-DP mechanisms, and gave a mechanism
that has error within factor O(log3 d) of the optimal assuming a conjecture from convex geometry known as
the hyperplane conjecture or the slicing conjecture. Bhaskara et al. [BDKT12] removed the dependence on the
hyperplane conjecture and improved the approximation ratio to O(log2 d). Can relaxing the privacy requirement
to (ε, δ)-DP help with accuracy? In many settings, (ε, δ)-DP mechanisms can be simpler and more accurate than
the best known ε-DP mechanisms. This motivates the first question we address.
Question 1 Given A, can we efficiently approximate the optimal error (ε, δ)-DP mechanism for it?
Hardt and Talwar [HT10] showed that for some A, the lower bound for ε-DP mechanism can be Ω(logN) larger
than known (ε, δ)-DP mechanisms. For non-linear Lipschitz queries, De [De12] showed that this gap can be as
large as Ω(
√
d) (even when N = d). This leads us to ask:
Question 2 How large can the gap between the optimal ε-DP mechanism and the optimal (ε, δ)-DP mechanism
be for linear queries?
When the databases are sparse, e.g. when ‖x‖1 ≤ n d, one may obtain better mechanisms. Blum, Ligett and
Roth [BLR08] gave an ε-DP mechanism that can answer any set of d counting queries with error O˜(dn
4
3 ). A series
of subsequent works [DNR+09,DRV10,RR10,HR10,GHRU11,HLM12,GRU12] led to (ε, δ)-DP mechanisms that
have error only O˜(dn). Thus when n < d, the lower bound of O(d2) for arbitrary databases can be breached by
exploiting the sparsity of the database. This motivates a more refined measure of error that takes the sparsity
of A into account. Given an A and n, one can ask for the mechanism M that minimizes the sparse case error
maxx:‖x‖1≤n E[‖M(x)−Ax‖22]. The next set of questions we study address this measure.
Question 3 Given A and n, can we approximate the optimal sparse case error (ε, δ)-DP mechanism for A when
restricted to databases of size at most n?
Question 4 Given A and n, can we approximate the optimal sparse case error ε-DP mechanism for A when
restricted to databases of size at most n?
1Here and in the rest of the introduction, we suppress the dependence of the error on ε and δ.
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The gap between the O˜(dn
4
3 ) error ε-DP mechanism of [BLR08] and the O˜(dn) error (ε, δ)-DP mechanism
of [HR10] leads us to ask:
Question 5 Is there an ε-DP mechanism with error O˜(dn) for databases of size at most n?
1.1 Results
In this work, we answer Questions 1-5 above. Denote by BN1 , {x ∈ RN : ‖x‖1 ≤ 1} the N -dimensional `1 ball.
Recall that for any query matrix A ∈ Rd×N and any set X ⊆ RN , the (worst-case expected squared) error of M
is defined as
errM(A,X) , max
x∈X
E[‖M(x)−Ax‖22] .
In this paper, we are interested in both the case when X = RN , called the dense case, and when X = nBN1 for
n < d, called the sparse case. We also write errM(A) , errM(A,RN ) and errM(A,n) , errM(A,nBN1 ).
Our first result is a simple and efficient mechanism that for query matrix A gives an O(log2 d) approximation to
the optimal error.
Theorem 1 Given a query matrix A ∈ Rd×N , there is an efficient (ε, δ)-DP mechanism M and an efficiently
computable lower bound LA such that
• errM (A) ≤ O(log2 d log 1/δ) · LA, and
• for any (ε, δ)-DP mechanism M′, errM′(A, d) ≥ LA.
We also show that the gap of Ω(log(N/d)) between ε-DP and (ε, δ)-DP mechanisms shown in [HT10] is essentially
the worst possible, within polylog(d) factor, for linear queries. More precisely, the lower bound on ε-DP mecha-
nisms used in [HT10] is always within O(log(N/d) polylog(d)) of the lower bound LA computed by our algorithm
above. Let M∗ denote the ε-DP generalized K-norm mechanism in [HT10].
Theorem 2 For any (ε, δ)-DP mechanism M, errM(A) = Ω(1/(logO(1)(d) log(N/d))) errM∗(A).
We next move to the sparse case. Here we give results analogous to the dense case with a slightly worse approxi-
mation ratio.
Theorem 3 Given A ∈ Rd×N and a bound n, there is an efficient (ε, δ)-DP mechanism M and an efficiently
computable lower bound LA,n such that
• errM(A,n) ≤ O(log3/2 d ·
√
logN log 1/δ + log2 d log 1/δ) · LA,n, and
• For any (ε, δ)-DP mechanism M′, errM′(A,n) ≥ LA,n.
Theorem 4 Given A ∈ Rd×N and a bound n, there is an efficient ε-DP mechanism M and an efficiently
computable lower bound LA,n such that
• errM(A,n) ≤ O(logO(1) d · log3/2N) · LA,n, and
• For any ε-DP mechanism M′, errM′(A,n) ≥ LA,n.
We remark that in these theorems, our upper bounds hold for all x with ‖x‖1 ≤ n, whereas the lower bounds
hold even when x is an integer vector.
The (ε, δ)-DP mechanism of Theorem 3 when run on any counting query has error no larger than the best known
bounds [GRU12] for counting queries, up to constants (not ignoring logarithmic factors). The ε-DP mechanism
of Theorem 4 when run on any counting query can be shown to have nearly the same asymptotics, answering
question 5 in the affirmative.
Theorem 5 For any counting query A, there is an ε-DP mechanism M such that errM(A,n) = O˜(dn).
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We will summarize some key ideas we use to achieve these results. More details will follow in Section 1.2.
For the upper bounds, the first crucial step is to decompose A into “geometrically nice” components and then add
Gaussian noise to each component. This is similar to the approach in [HT10,BDKT12] but we use the minimum
volume enclosing ellipsoid, rather than the M -ellipsoid used in those works, to facilitate the decomposition process.
This allows us to handle the approximate and the sparse cases. In addition, it simplifies the mechanism as well
as the analysis. For the sparse case, we further couple the mechanism with least squares estimation of the noisy
answer with respect to nABN1 . By utilizing techniques from statistical estimation, we can show that this process
can reduce the error when n < d, and prove an error upper bound dependent on the size of the smallest projection
of nABN1 .
For the lower bounds, we first lower bound the accuracy of (, δ)-DP mechanism by the hereditary discrepancy
of the query matrix A, which we in turn lower bound in terms of the least singular values of submatrices of A.
Finally, we close the loop by utilizing the restricted invertibility principle by Bourgain and Tzafriri [BT87] and
its extension by Vershynin [Ver01] which, informally, shows that if there does not exist a “small” projection of
nABN1 then A has a “large” submatrix with a “large” least singular value.
Approximating Hereditary Discrepancy
The discrepancy of a matrix A ∈ Rd×N is defined to be disc(A) = minx∈{−1,+1}N ‖Ax‖∞. The hereditary
discrepancy of a matrix is defined as herdisc(A) = maxS⊆[N ] disc(A|S), where A|S denotes the matrix A restricted
to the columns indexed by S.
As hereditary discrepancy is a maximum over exponentially many submatrices, it is not a priori clear if there
even exists a polynomial-time verifiable certificate for low hereditary discrepancy. Additionally, we can show that
it is NP-hard to approximate hereditary discrepancy to within a factor of 3/2. Bansal [Ban10] gave a pseudo-
approximation algorithm for hereditary discrepancy, which efficiently computes a coloring of discrepancy at most
a factor of O(log dN) larger than herdisc(A) for a d×N matrix A. His algorithm allows efficiently computing a
lower bound on herdisc for any restriction A|S ; however, such a lower bound may be arbitrarily loose, and before
our work it was not known how to efficiently compute nearly matching lower and upper bounds on herdisc.
Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [MN12] show that for a query matrix A ∈ Rd×N , the error of any (ε, δ)-DP mechanism
is lower bounded by (an `22 version of) (herdisc(A))
2 (up to logarithmic factors). Moreover, the lower bound used
in Theorem 1 is in fact a lower bound on this version of herdisc(A). Using the von Neumann minimax theorem, we
can go between the `22 and the `∞ versions of these concepts, allowing us to sandwich the hereditary discrepancy
of A between two quantities: a determinant based lower bound and the efficiently computable expected error of
the private mechanism. As the two quantities are nearly matching, our work therefore leads to a polylogarithmic
approximation to the hereditary discrepancy of any matrix A.
1.2 Techniques
In addition to known techniques from the differential privacy literature, our work borrows tools from discrepancy
theory, convex geometry and statistical estimation. We next briefly describe how they fit in.
Central to designing a provably good approximation algorithm is an efficiently computable lower bound on the
optimum. Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [MN12] proved that (a slight variant of) the hereditary discrepancy of A
leads to a lower bound for the error of any (ε, δ)-DP mechanism. Lova´sz, Spencer and Vesztergombi [LSV86]
showed that hereditary discrepancy itself can be lower bounded by a quantity called the determinant lower bound.
Geometrically, this lower bound corresponds to picking the d columns of A that (along with the origin) give us
a simplex with the largest possible volume. The volume or this simplex, appropriately normalized, gives us a
lower bound on OPT. More precisely for any simplex S, d3 · vol(S) 2d log2 d gives a lower bound on the error.
The log2 d factor can be removed by using a lower bound based on the least singular values of submatrices of
A. Geometrically, for the least singular value lower bound we need to find a simplex of large volume whose d
non-zero vertices are also nearly pairwise orthogonal.
If the N columns of A all lie in a unit ball of radius R, it can be shown that adding Gaussian noise proportional
to R suffices to guarantee (ε, δ)-DP, resulting in a mechanism having total squared error dR2. Can we relate
this quantity to the lower bound? It turns out that if the unit ball of radius R is the minimum volume ellipsoid
containing the columns of A, this can be done. In this case, a result of Vershynin [Ver01], building on the restricted
invertability results by Bourgain and Tzafriri [BT87], tells us that one can find Ω(d) vertices of K that touch
the minimum containing ellipsoid, and are nearly orthogonal. The simplex formed by these vertices therefore
has large volume, giving us a (ε, δ)-DP lower bound of Ω(dR2). In this case, the Gaussian mechanism with the
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optimal R is within a constant factor of the lower bound. When the minimum volume enclosing ellipsoid is not
a ball, we need to project the query along the d2 shortest axes of this ellipsoid, answer this projection using the
Gaussian mechanism, and recurse on the orthogonal projection. Using the full power of the restricted invertability
result by Vershynin allows us to construct a large simplex and prove our competitive ratio.
Hardt and Talwar [HT10] also used a volume based lower bound, but for ε-DP mechanisms, one can take K, the
symmetric convex hull of all the columns of A and use its volume instead of the volume of S in the lower bound
above. How do these lower bounds compare? By a result of Ba´ra´ny and Fu¨redi [BF88] and Gluskin [Glu07], one
can show that the volume of the convex hull of N points can be bounded by (logN)d/2d−d/2 times that of the
minimum enclosing ellipsoid. This, along with the aforementioned restricted invertability results, allows us to
prove that the ε-DP lower bound is within O((logN) polylog d) of the (ε, δ)-DP lower bound.
How do we handle sparse queries? The first observation is that the lower bounding technique gives us d columns
of A and the resulting lower bound holds not just for A but even for the d× d submatrix of A corresponding to
the maximum volume simplex S; moreover, the lower bound holds even when all databases are restricted to O(d)
individuals. Thus the lower bound holds when n = O(d) and this value marks the transition between the sparse
and the dense cases. Moreover, when the minimum volume ellipsoid containing the columns of A is a ball, the
restricted invertibility principle of Bourgain and Tzafriri and Vershynin gives us a d-dimensional simplex with
nearly pairwise orthogonal vertices, and, therefore any n-dimensional face of this simplex is another simplex of
large volume. The large n-dimensional simplex gives a lower bound on error when databases are restricted to
have at most n individuals.
For smaller n, the error added by the Gaussian mechanism may be too large, and even though the value Ax
lies in nABN1 , the noisy answer will likely fall outside this set. A common technique in statistical estimation
for handling such error is to “project” the noisy point back into nABN1 , i.e. report the point yˆ in nAB
N
1 that
minimizes the Euclidean distance to the noisy answer y˜. This projection step provably reduces the expected error!
Geometrically, we use well known techniques from statistics to show that the error after projection is bounded
by the “shadow” that nABN1 leaves on the noise vector; this shadow is much smaller than the length of the noise
vector when n = o(d). In fact, when the noise is a spherical Gaussian, it can be shown that ‖yˆ−y‖22 is only about
n
d ‖y˜− y‖22. This gives near optimal bounds for the case when the minimum volume ellipsoid is a ball; the general
case is handled using a recursive mechanism as before.
To get an ε-DP mechanism, we use the K-norm mechanism [HT10] instead of Gaussian noise. To bound the
shadow of nABN1 on w, where w is the noise vector generated by the K-norm mechanism, we first analyze
the expectation of 〈ai, w〉 for any column of A, and we use the log concavity of the noise distribution to prove
concentration of this random variable. A union bound helps complete the argument as in the Gaussian case.
1.3 Related Work
Dwork et al. [DMNS06] showed that any query can be released while adding noise proportional to the total
sensitivity of the query. This motivated the question of designing mechanisms with good guarantees for any set
of low sensitivity queries. Nissim, Raskhodnikova and Smith [NRS07] showed that adding noise proportional
to (a smoothed version of) the local sensitivity of the query suffices for guaranteeing differential privacy; this
may be much smaller than the worst case sensitivity for non-linear queries. Lower bounds on the amount of
noise needed for general low sensitivity queries have been shown in [DN03, DMT07, DY08, DMNS06, RHS07,
HT10, De12]. Kasiviswathan et al. [KRSU10] showed upper and lower bounds for contingency table queries
and more recently [KRS13] showed lower bounds on publishing error rates of classifiers or even M-estimators.
Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [MN12] showed that combinatorial discrepancy lower bounds the noise for answering
any set of linear queries.
Using learning theoretic techniques, Blum, Ligett and Roth [BLR08] first showed that one can exploit sparsity of
the database, and answer a large number of counting queries with error small compared to the number of individu-
als in the database. This line of work has been further extended and improved in terms of error bounds, efficiency,
generality and interactivity in several subsequent works [DNR+09,DRV10,RR10,HR10,GHRU11,HLM12].
Ghosh, Roughgarden and Sundarajan [GRS09] showed that for any one dimensional counting query, a discrete
version of the Laplacian mechanism is optimal for pure privacy in a very general utilitarian framework and Gupte
and Sundararajan [GS10] extended this to risk averse agents. Brenner and Nissim [BN10] showed that such
universally optimal private mechanisms do not exist for two counting queries or for a single non-binary sum
query. As mentioned above, Hardt and Talwar [HT10], and Bhaskara et al. [BDKT12] gave relative guarantees
for multi-dimensional queries under pure privacy with respect to total squared error. De [De12] unified and
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strengthened these bounds and showed stronger lower bounds for the class of non-linear low sensitivity queries.
For specific queries of interest, improved upper bounds are known. Barak et al. [BCD+07] studied low dimensional
marginals and showed that by running the Laplace mechanism on a different set of queries, one can reduce
error. Using a similar strategy, improved mechanisms were given by [XWG10, CSS10] for orthogonal counting
queries, and near optimal mechanisms were given by Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [MN12] for halfspace counting
queries. The approach of answering a set of queries different from the target query set has also been studied in
more generality and for other sets of queries by [LHR+10,DWHL11,RHS07,XWG10,XXY10,YZW+12]. Li and
Miklau [LM12a,LM12b] study a class of mechanisms called extended matrix mechanisms and show that one can
efficiently find the best mechanisms from this class. Hay et al. [HRMS10] show that in certain settings such as
unattributed histograms, correcting noisy answers to enforce a consistency constraint can improve accuracy.
Very recently, Fawaz et al. [FMN] used the hereditary discrepancy lower bounds of Muthukrishnan and Nikolov,
as well as the determinant lower bound on discrepancy of Lovasz, Spencer, and Vesztergombi, to prove that a
certain Gaussian noise mechanism is nearly optimal (in the dense setting) for computing any given convolution
map. Like our algorithms, their algorithm adds correlated Gaussian noise; however, they always use the Fourier
basis to correlate the noise.
We refer the reader to texts by Chazelle [Cha00] and Matousˇek [Mat99] and the chapter by Beck and So´s [BS95]
for an introduction to discrepancy theory. Bansal [Ban10] showed that a semidefinite relaxation can be used to
design a pseudo-approximation algorithm for hereditary discrepancy. Matousˇek [Mat11] showed that the deter-
minant based lower bound of Lova´sz, Spencer and Vesztergombi [LSV86] is tight up to polylogarithmic factors.
Larsen [Lar11] showed applications of hereditary discrepancy to data structure lower bounds, and Chandrasekaran
and Vempala [CV11] recently showed applications of hereditary discrepancy to problems in integer programming.
Roadmap. In Section 2.3.3 we introduce relevant preliminaries. In Section 3 we present our main results
for approximate differential privacy, and in Section 4 we present our main results for pure differential privacy.
In Section 5 we prove absolute upper bounds on the error required for privately answering sets of d counting
queries. In Section 6 we give some extensions and applications of our main results, namely an optimal efficient
mechanism for `∞ error in the dense case, and the efficient approximation to hereditary discrepancy implied by
that mechanism. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
We start by introducing some basic notation.
Let Bd1 , and B
d
2 be, respectively, the `1 and `2 unit balls in R
d. Also, let sym{a1, . . . aN} be the convex hull
of the vectors ±a1, . . . ,±aN . Equivalently, sym{a1, . . . , aN} = ABN1 where A is a matrix whose columns equal
a1, . . . , aN .
For a d×N matrix A and a set S ⊆ [N ], we denote by A|S the submatrix of A consisting of those columns of A
indexed by elements of S. Occasionally we refer to a matrix V whose columns form an orthonormal basis for some
subspace of interest V as the orthonormal basis of V. Pk is the set of orthogonal projections onto k-dimensional
subspaces of Rd.
By σmin(A) and σmax(A) we denote, respectively, the smallest and largest singular value of A. I.e., σmin(A) =
minx:‖x‖2=1 ‖Ax‖2 and σmax(A) = maxx:‖x‖2=1 ‖Ax‖2. In general, σi(A) is the i-th largest singular value of A,
and λi(A) is the i-th largest eigenvalue of A. We recall the minimax characterization of eigenvalues for symmetric
matrices:
λi = maxV:dimV=i
min
x∈V:‖x‖2=1
xTAx.
For a matrix A (and the corresponding linear operator), we denote by ‖A‖2 = σmax(A) the spectral norm of A
and ‖A‖F =
√∑
i σ
2
i (A) =
√∑
i,j a
2
i,j the Frobenius norm of A. By kerA we denote the kernel of A, i.e. the
subspace of vectors x for which Ax = 0.
2.1 Geometry
For a set K ⊆ Rd, we denote by vold(K) its d-dimensional volume. Often we use instead the volume radius
vradd(K) , (vol(K)/ vol(Bd2 ))1/d.
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Subscripts are omitted when this does not cause confusion. When K lies in a k-dimensional affine subspace of
Rd, vol(K) and vrad(K) (without subscripts) are understood to imply volk and vradk, respectively.
For a convex body K ⊆ Rd, the polar body K◦ is defined by K◦ = {y : 〈y, x〉 ≤ 1 ∀x ∈ K}. The fundamental
fact about polar bodies we use is that for any two convex bodies K and L
K ⊆ L⇔ L◦ ⊆ K◦. (1)
In the remainder of this paper, when we claim that a fact follows “by convex duality,” we mean that it is implied
by (1).
A convex body K is (centrally) symmetric if −K = K. The Minkowski norm ‖x‖K induced by a symmetric
convex body K is defined as ‖x‖K , min{r ∈ R : x ∈ rK}. The Minkowski norm induced by the polar body
K◦ of K is the dual norm of ‖x‖K and also has the form ‖y‖K◦ = maxx∈K 〈x, y〉. For convex symmetric K, the
induced norm and dual norm satisfy Ho¨lder’s inequality:
|〈x, y〉| ≤ ‖x‖K‖y‖K◦ . (2)
An ellipsoid in Rd is the image of Bd2 under an affine map. All ellipsoids we consider are symmetric, and therefore,
are equal to an image FBd2 of the ball B
d
2 under a linear map F . A full dimensional ellipsoid E = FB
d
2 can be
equivalently defined as E = {x : xT (FFT )−1x ≤ 1}. The polar body of a symmetric ellipsoid E = FBd2 is the
ellipsoid (or cylinder with an ellipsoid as its base in case F is not full dimensional) E◦ = {x : xTFFTx ≤ 1}.
We repeatedly use a classical theorem of Fritz John, characterizing the (unique) minimum volume enclosing
ellipsoid (MEE) of any convex body K. We note that John’s theorem is frequently stated in terms of the
maximum volume enclosed ellipsoid in K; the two variants of the theorem are equivalent by convex duality. The
MEE of K is also known as a the Lo¨wner or Lo¨wner-John ellipsoid of K.
Theorem 6 ( [Joh48]) Any convex body K ⊆ Rd is contained in a unique ellipsoid of minimal volume. This
ellipsoid is Bd2 if and only if there exist unit vectors u1, . . . , um ∈ K ∩Bd2 and positive reals c1, . . . , cm such that∑
ciui = 0∑
ciuiu
T
i = I
According to John’s characterization, when the MEE of K is the ball Bd2 , the contact points of K and B
d
2 satisfy
a structural property — the identity decomposes into a linear combination of the projection matrices onto the
lines of the contact points. Intuitively, this means that K “hits” Bd2 in all directions — it has to, or otherwise
Bd2 can be “pinched” in order to produce a smaller ellipsoid that still contains K. This intuition is formalized by
a theorem of Vershynin, which generalizes the work of Bourgain and Tzafriri on restricted invertibility [BT87].
Vershynin ( [Ver01] Theorem 3.1) shows that there exist Ω(d) contact points of K and Bd2 which are approximately
pairwise orthogonal.
Theorem 7 ( [Ver01]) Let K ⊆ Rd be a symmetric convex body whose minimum volume enclosing ellipsoid is
the unit ball Bd2 . Let T be a linear map with spectral norm ‖T‖2 ≤ 1. Then for any β, there exist constant C1(β),
C2(β) and contact points x1, . . . , xk with k ≥ (1− β)‖T‖2F such that the matrix TX = (Txi)ki=1 satisfies
C1(β)
‖T‖F√
d
≤ σmin(TX) ≤ σmax(TX) ≤ C2(β)‖T‖F√
d
2.2 Statistical Estimation
A key element in our algorithms for the sparse case is the use of least squares estimation to reduce error. Below we
present a bound on the error of least squares estimation with respect to symmetric convex bodies. This analysis
appears to be standard in the statistics literature; a special case of it appears for example in [RWY11].
Lemma 1 Let L ⊆ Rd be a symmetric convex body, and let y ∈ L and y˜ = y + w for some w ∈ Rd. Let, finally,
yˆ = arg minyˆ∈L ‖yˆ − y˜‖22. We have ‖yˆ − y‖22 ≤ min{4‖w‖22, 4‖w‖L◦}.
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Figure 1: A schematic illustration of the proof of Lemma 1. The vector p−y is proportional in length to 〈yˆ−y, w〉
and the vector yˆ − p is proportional in length to 〈yˆ − y, yˆ − y˜〉. As ‖w‖ ≥ ‖yˆ − ‖y˜‖, ‖p− y‖ ≥ ‖yˆ − p‖.
Proof: First we show the easier bound ‖yˆ − y‖2 ≤ 2‖w‖2, which follows by the triangle inequality:
‖yˆ − y‖2 ≤ ‖yˆ − y˜‖2 + ‖y˜ − y‖2 ≤ 2‖y˜ − y‖2.
The second bound is based on Ho¨lder’s inequality and the following simple but very useful fact, illustrated
schematically in Figure 1:
‖yˆ − y‖22 = 〈yˆ − y, y˜ − y〉+ 〈yˆ − y, yˆ − y˜〉
≤ 2〈yˆ − y, y˜ − y〉. (3)
The inequality (3) follows from
〈yˆ − y, y˜ − y〉 = ‖y˜ − y‖22 + 〈yˆ − y˜, y˜ − y〉 ≥ ‖yˆ − y˜‖22 + 〈yˆ − y˜, y˜ − y〉 = 〈yˆ − y˜, yˆ − y〉.
Inequality (3), w = y˜ − y, and Ho¨lder’s inequality imply
‖yˆ − y‖22 ≤ 2〈yˆ − y, w〉 ≤ 2‖yˆ − y‖L‖w‖L◦ ≤ 4‖w‖L◦ ,
which completes the proof. 
2.3 Differential Privacy
Following recent work in differential privacy, we model private data as a database D of n rows, where each row
of D contains information about an individual. Formally, a database D is a multiset of size n of elements of
the universe U = {t1, . . . , tN} of possible user types. Our algorithms take as input a histogram x ∈ RN of the
database D, where the i-th component xi of x encodes the number of individuals in D of type ti. Notice that in
this histogram representation, we have ‖x‖1 = n when D is a database of size n. Also, two neighboring databases
D and D′ that differ in the presence or absence of a single individual correspond to two histograms x and x′
satisfying ‖x− x′‖1 = 1.
Through most of this paper, we work under the notion of approximate differential privacy. The definition follows.
Definition 1 ( [DMNS06,DKM+06b]) A (randomized) algorithmM with input domain RN and output range
Y is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every n, every x, x′ with ‖x − x′‖1 ≤ 1, and every measurable S ⊆ Y , M
satisfies
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr[M(x′) ∈ S] + δ.
When δ = 0, we are in the regime of pure differential privacy.
An important basic property of differential privacy is that the privacy guarantees degrade smoothly under com-
position and are not affected by post-processing.
Lemma 2 ( [DMNS06,DKM+06b]) LetM1 andM2 satisfy (ε1, δ1)- and (ε2, δ2)-differential privacy, respec-
tively. Then the algorithm which on input x outputs the tuple (M1(x),M2(M1(x),x)) satisfies (ε1 + ε2, δ1 + δ2)-
differential privacy.
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2.3.1 Optimality for Linear Queries
In this paper we study the necessary and sufficient error incurred by differentially private algorithms for approxi-
mating linear queries. A set of d linear queries is given by a d×N query matrix or workload A; the exact answers
to the queries on a histogram x are given by the d-dimensional vector y = Ax.
We define error as total squared error. More precisely, for an algorithm M and a subset X ⊆ RN , we define
errM(A,X) , sup
x∈X
E‖Ax−M(A, x)‖22.
We also write errM(A,nBN1 ) as errM(A,n). The optimal error achievable by any (ε, δ)-differentially private
algorithm for queries A and databases of size up to n is
optε,δ(A,n) , infM errM(A,n),
where the infimum is taken over all (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithms. When no restrictions are placed on
the size n of the database, the appropriate notion of optimal error is optε,δ(A) , supn optε,δ(A,n). Similarly, for
an algorithm M, the error when database size is not bounded is errM(A) , supn errM(A,n). A priori it is not
clear that these quantities are necessarily finite, but we will show that this is the case.
In order to get tight dependence on the privacy parameter ε in our analyses, we will use the following relationship
between optε,δ(A,n) and optε′,δ′(A,n).
Lemma 3 For any ε, any δ < 1, any integer k and for δ′ ≥ ekε−1eε−1 δ,
optε,δ(A,n) ≥ k2 optkε,δ′(A,n/k).
Proof: Let M be an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm achieving optε,δ(A,n). We will use M as a black box
to construct a (kε, δ′)-differentially private algorithm M′ which satisfies the error guarantee errM′(A,n/k) ≤
1
k2 errM(A,n).
The algorithm M′ on input x satisfying ‖x‖1 ≤ n/k outputs 1kM(kx). We need to show that M′ satisfies
(kε, δ′)-differential privacy. Let x and x′ be two neighboring inputs to M′, i.e. ‖x − x′‖1 ≤ 1, and let S be a
measurable subset of the output M′. Denote p1 = Pr[M′(x) ∈ S] and p2 = Pr[M′(x′) ∈ S]. We need to show
that p1 ≤ ekεp2 + δ′. To that end, define x0 = kx, x1 = kx + (x′ − x), x2 = kx + 2(x′ − x), . . ., xk = kx′.
Applying the (ε, δ)-privacy guarantee of M to each of the pairs of neighboring inputs x0, x1, x1, x2, . . ., xk−1, xk
in sequence gives us
p1 ≤ ekεp2 + (1 + eε + . . .+ e(k−1)ε)δ = ekεp2 + e
kε − 1
eε − 1 δ.
This finishes the proof of privacy for M′. It is straightforward to verify that errM′(A,n/k) ≤ 1k2 errM(A,n). 
Above, we state the error and optimal error definitions for histograms x, which can be arbitrary real vectors. All
our algorithms work in this general setting. Recall, however, that the histograms arising from our definition of
databases are integer vectors. Our lower bounds do hold against integer histograms as well. Therefore, defining
err and opt in terms of integer histograms (i.e. taking errM(A,n) , errM(A,nBN1 ∩ NN )) does not change the
asymptotics of our theorems.
2.3.2 Gaussian Noise Mechanism
A basic mechanism for achieving (ε, δ)-differential privacy for linear queries is adding appropriately scaled inde-
pendent Gaussian noise to each query. This approach goes back to the work of Blum et al. [BDMN05], predating
the definition of differential privacy. Next we define this basic mechanism formally and give a privacy guaran-
tee. The privacy analysis of the Gaussian mechanism in the context of (ε, δ)-differential privacy was first given
in [DKM+06b]. We give the full proof here for completeness.
Lemma 4 Let A = (ai)
N
i=1 be a d × N matrix such that ∀i : ‖ai‖2 ≤ σ. Then a mechanism which on input
x ∈ RN outputs Ax+ w, where w ∼ N(0, σ 1+
√
2 ln(1/δ)
ε )
d, satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
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Proof: Let C =
1+
√
2 ln(1/δ)
ε and let p be the probability density function of N(0, Cσ)
d. Let also K = AB1, so
‖x− x′‖1 ∈ B1 implies A(x− x′) ∈ K ⊆ Bd2 . Define
Dv(w) , ln
p(w)
p(w + v)
.
We will prove that when w ∼ N(0, Cσ), for all v ∈ K, Pr[|Dv(w)| > ε] ≤ δ. This suffices to prove (ε, δ)-differential
privacy. Indeed, let the algorithm output Ax+ w and fix any x′ s.t. ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 1. Let v = A(x− x′) ∈ K and
S = {w : |Dv(w)| > ε}. For any measurable T ⊆ Rd we have
Pr[Ax+ w ∈ T ] = Pr[w ∈ T −Ax]
=
∫
S∩(T−Ax)
p(w) dw +
∫
S¯∩(T−Ax)
p(w) dw
≤ δ + eε
∫
S¯∩(T−Ax′)
p(w) dw
= δ + eεPr[w ∈ T −Ax′] = δ + eεPr[Ax′ + w ∈ T ].
We fix an arbitrary v ∈ K and proceed to prove |Dv(w)| ≤ ε with probability at least 1−δ. We will first compute
EDv(w) and then apply a tail bound. Recall that p(w) ∝ exp(− 12C2σ2 ‖w‖22). Notice also that, since v ∈ K can
be written as
∑N
i=1 αiai where
∑ |αi| ≤ 1, we have ‖v‖2 ≤ σ. Then we can write
EDv(w) = E
‖v + w‖22 − ‖w‖22
2C2σ2
= E
‖v‖2 + 2vTw
2C2σ2
≤ 1
2C2
Note that to bound |Dv(w)| we simply need to bound 1C2σ2 vTw from above and below. Since 1C2σ2 vTw ∼
N(0, ‖v‖Cσ ), we can apply a Chernoff bound and we get
Pr
[
|vTw| > 1
C
√
2 ln(1/δ)
]
≤ δ.
Therefore, with probability 1− δ,
1/2C −√2 ln(1/δ)
C
≤ Dv(w) ≤ 1/2C +
√
2 ln(1/δ)
C
.
Substituting C ≥ 1+
√
2 ln(1/δ)
ε completes the proof. 
The following corollary is a useful geometric generalization of Lemma 4.
Corollary 8 Let A = (ai)
N
i=1 be a d×N matrix of rank d and let K = sym{a1, . . . , aN}. Let E = FBd2 (F is a
linear map) be an ellipsoid containing K. Then a mechanism that outputs Ax+Fw where w ∼ N(0, 1+
√
2 ln(1/δ)
ε )
d
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof: Since K is full dimensional (by rankA = d) and E contains K, E is full dimensional as well, and, therefore,
F is an invertible linear map. Define G = F−1A. For each column gi of G, we have ‖gi‖2 ≤ 1. Therefore, by
Lemma 4, a mechanism that outputs Gx+w (where w is distributed as in the statement of the corollary) satisfies
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. Therefore, FGx+ Fw = Ax+ Fw is (ε, δ)-differentially private by the post-processing
property of differential privacy. 
We present a composition theorem, specific to composing Gaussian noise mechanisms. We note that a similar
composition result in a much more general setting but with slightly inferior dependence on the parameters is
proven in [DRV10].
Corollary 9 Let V1, . . . ,Vk be vector spaces of respective dimensions d1, . . . , dk, such that ∀i ≤ k−1, Vi+1 ⊆ V⊥i
and d1 + . . .+ dk = d . Let A = (ai)
N
i=1 be a d×N matrix of rank d and let K = sym(a1, . . . , aN ). Let Πi be the
projection matrix for Vi and let Ei = FiBdi2 ⊆ Vi be an ellipsoid such that ΠiK ⊆ Ei. Then the mechanism that
outputs Ax+
√
k
∑k
i=1 Fiwi where for each i, wi ∼ N(0,
1+
√
2 ln(1/δ)
ε )
di , satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
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Proof: Let c(ε, δ) =
1+
√
2 ln(1/δ)
ε . Since the random variables F1w1, . . . , Fkwk are pairwise independent Gaussian
random variables, and Fiwi has covariance matrix c(ε, δ)
2FiF
T
i , we have that w =
√
k
∑k
i=1 Fiwi is a Gaussian
random variable with covariance c(ε, δ)2G, whee G = k
∑k
i=1 FiF
T
i . By Corollary 8, it is sufficient to show
that the ellipsoid E = GBd2 contains K. By convex duality, this is equivalent to showing E
◦ ⊆ K◦, which is
in turn equivalent to ∀x : ‖x‖K◦ ≤ ‖x‖E◦ . Recalling that ‖x‖2E◦ = xTGGTx and ‖x‖K◦ = maxy∈K 〈y, x〉 =
maxNj=1 〈aj , x〉, we need to establish
∀x ∈ Rd,∀j ∈ [N ] : 〈aj , x〉2 ≤ xTGGTx. (4)
We proceed by establishing (4). Since for all i, ΠiK ⊆ Ei, by duality and the same reasoning as above, we have
that for all i and j, 〈Πiaj , x〉2 ≤ xTFiFTi x. Therefore, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
〈aj , x〉2 =
(
k∑
i=1
〈Πiaj , x〉
)2
≤ k
k∑
i=1
〈Πiaj , x〉2
≤ k
k∑
i=1
xTFiF
Tx = xTGGTx.
This completes the proof. 
2.3.3 Noise Lower Bounds
We will make extensive use of a lower bound on the noise complexity of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms
in terms of combinatorial discrepancy. First we need to define the notion of hereditary α-discrepancy:
herdiscα(A,n) , max
S⊆[N ]:|S|≤n
min
x∈{−1,0,+1}S
‖x‖1≥α|S|
‖(A|S)x‖2.
We denote herdisc(A) , maxn herdisc1(A,n). An equivalent notation is herdisc`2(A). When the `2 norm is
substituted with `∞, we have the classical notion hereditary discrepancy, here denoted herdisc`∞(A).
Next we present the lower bound, which is a simple extension of the discrepancy lower bound on noise recently
proved by Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [MN12].
Theorem 10 ( [MN12]) Let A be an d × N real matrix. For any constant α and sufficiently small constant
ε ≤ ε(α) and δ ≤ δ(α),
optε,δ(A,n) = Ω(1) herdiscα(A,n)
2.
We further develop two lower bounds for herdiscα(A,n) which are more convenient to work with. The first lower
bound is by using spectral techniques. Observe first that, since the `2-norm of any vector does not increase under
projection, we have herdiscα(A,n) ≥ herdiscα(ΠA,n) for any projection matrix Π. Furthermore, recall that for a
matrix M , σmin(M) = minx:‖x‖2=1 ‖Mx‖2. For any x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}S satisfying ‖x‖1 ≥ α|S|, we have ‖x‖22 ≥ α|S|.
Therefore,
herdiscα(A,n)
2 ≥ max
S⊆[N ]:|S|≤n
α|S|σ2min(A|S). (5)
Let’s define
specLB(A,n) , max
S⊆[N ]
|S|=k≤n
max
Π∈Pk
kσ2min(ΠA|S).
Substituting (5) into Theorem 10, we have that there exist constants c1 and c2 such that
optc1,c2(A,n) = Ω(1) · specLB(A,n). (6)
For the remainder of this paper we fix some constants c1 and c2 for which (6) holds. Similarly to the notation
for opt, we will also sometimes denote specLB(A) = maxn specLB(A,n). We will use primarily the spectral lower
bound (6) for arguing the optimality of our algorithms.
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To show the small gap between the approximate and pure privacy (Theorem 2), we next develop a determinant
based lower bound. We first switch from herdiscα to the classical notion of hereditary discrepancy, equivalent to
herdisc1, by observing the following relation between herdiscα and herdisc1 from [MN12]:
herdisc1(A,n) ≤ log n
log 11−α
herdiscα(A,n) (7)
We then use an extension of the classical determinant lower bound for hereditary discrepancy, due to Lova´sz,
Spencer, and Vesztergombi.
Theorem 11 ( [LSV86]) For any real d×N matrix A,
(herdisc1(A,n))
2 ≥ Ω(1) · detLB(A,n) , max
k≤n
max
Π∈Pk
S⊆[N ]:|S|=k
k · | det(ΠA|S)|2/k.
Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps: showing that a quantity known as linear discrepancy is at most a
constant factor larger than hereditary discrepancy; lower bounding linear discrepancy in terms of detLB. Most of
the proof can be adapted with little modification from proofs of the lower bound on `∞ discrepancy in [LSV86].
Here we follow the exposition in [Cha00].
Let us first define linear discrepancy. For a d× k matrix M and c ∈ [−1, 1]k, let discc(M) be defined as
discc(M) , min
x∈{−1,1}k
‖Mx−Mc‖2
The linear discrepancy of M is then defined as lindisc(M) , maxc∈[−1,1]k discc(M). We claim that for any M ,
lindisc(M) ≤ 2 herdisc(M). (8)
The bound (8) is proven for the more common `∞ variants of lindisc and herdisc in [Cha00], but the proof can be
seen to apply without modification to discrepancy defined with respect to any norm. For completeness, we give
the full argument here. For c ∈ {−1, 0, 1}k, we have discc(M) ≤ herdisc(M). Call a vector c ∈ [−1, 1]k q-integral
if any coordinate ci of c can be written as
∑q
j=0 bj2
−j where (bj)
q
j=0 ∈ {0, 1}q+1. In other words, c is q-integral
if the binary expansion of any coordinate of c is identically zero after the q-th digit. The bound (8) holds for
0-integral c, and we prove that it holds for q-integral c by induction on q. For the induction step, assume that the
bound holds for any (q − 1)-integral c′ and let c be q-integral. Define s ∈ {−1, 1}n by setting si = −1 if ci ≥ 0
and si = 1 otherwise. Then c
′ = 2c + s ∈ [−1, 1]k is (q − 1)-integral, and, by the induction hypothesis, there
exists x1 ∈ {−1, 1}k such that ‖Mx1 −Mc′‖2 ≤ 2 herdisc(M). Let c′′ = x1−s2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}k. Dividing by 2 and
rearranging, we have ‖Mc′′ −Mc‖2 ≤ herdisc(M). The vector c′′ is 0-integral, and therefore there exists some
x2 ∈ {−1, 1}k such that ‖Mx2−Mc′′‖2 ≤ herdisc(M). By the triangle inequality, ‖Mx2−Mc‖2 ≤ 2 herdisc(M),
and this completes the inductive step.
We complete the proof of the theorem by proving a lower bound on lindisc in terms of detLB. We note that a
similar lower bound can be proved for any variant of lindisc defined in terms of any norm. The exact lower bound
will depend on the volume radius of the unit ball of the norm. Since the proof of (8) also works for any norm, we
get a determinant lower bound for hereditary discrepancy defined in terms of any norm as well.
We show that for any d× k matrix M
lindisc(M) = Ω(1) max
Π∈Pk
√
k|det ΠM |1/k. (9)
Letting k range over [n], M range over all d× k submatrices of A, and applying the bounds (8) and (9) implies
the theorem.
We proceed to prove (9). Note that if rank(M) < k, (9) is trivially true; therefore, we may assume that rank(M) =
k. Note also that without loss of generality we can take Π to be the orthogonal projection onto the range of M ,
since this is the projection operator that maximizes |det ΠM |. Let E be the ellipsoid E = {x : ‖Mx‖22 ≤ 1}. The
inequality lindisc(M) ≤ D is equivalent to
[−1, 1]k ⊆
⋃
x∈{−1,1}k
D · E + x. (10)
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Thus 2k = vol([−1, 1]d) ≤ 2k vol(D ·E), and therefore Dk ≥ 1vol(E) . On the other hand, the volume of E is equal
to
vol(E) =
vol(B2)
|det(MTM)|1/2 =
vol(B2)
|det(ΠM)| .
Applying the standard estimate vol(Bk2 )
1/k = Θ(k−1/2) completes the proof. 
By the determinant lower bound, and (7), we get our determinant lower bound on the noise necessary for privacy.
For some constant c1, c2 > 0,
optc1,c2(A,n) = Ω
(
1
log2 n
)
detLB(A,n). (11)
Finally, we recall the stronger volume lower bound against (ε, 0)-differential privacy from [HT10,BDKT12]. This
lower bound is nearly optimal for (ε, 0)-differential privacy, but does not hold for (ε, δ)-differential privacy when
δ is 2−o(d).
Theorem 12 ( [HT10,BDKT12]) For any d×N real matrix A = (ai)Ni=1,
optε,0(A,
d
ε
) ≥ volLB(A, ε) , dmax
k=1
max
Π∈Pk
k2
ε2
vrad(ΠK)2, (12)
where K = sym{ai}di=1.
Furthermore, there exists an efficient mechanism MK (the generalized K-norm mechanism) which is (ε, 0)-
differentially private and satisfies errMK (A) = O(log
3 d) volLB(A, ε).
3 Algorithms for Approximate Privacy
In this section we present our main results: efficient nearly optimal algorithms for approximate privacy in the
cases of dense databases (n > d/ε) and sparse databases (n = o(d/ε)). Both algorithms rely on recursively
computing an orthonormal basis for Rd, based on the minimum volume enclosing ellipsoid of the columns of the
query matrix A. We first present the algorithm for computing this basis, together with a property essential for
the analyses of the two algorithms presented next.
3.1 The Base Decomposition Algorithm
We first present an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that, given a matrix A ∈ Rd×N , computes a set of orthonormal
matrices U1, . . . , Uk, where k ≤ d1 + log de. For each i 6= j, UTi Uj = 0, and the union of the columns of U1, . . . , Uk
forms an orthonormal basis for Rd. Thus, Algorithm 1 computes a basis for Rd, and partitions (“decomposes”)
it into k = O(log d) bases of mutually orthogonal subspaces. This set of bases also induces a decomposition of A
into A = A1 + . . .+Ak, where Ai = UiU
T
i A. The base decomposition of Algorithm 1 is essential to both our dense
case and sparse case algorithms. Intuitively, for both cases we can show that the error of a simple mechanism
applied to Ai can be matched by an error lower bound for Ai+1 + . . . Ak. The error lower bounds are based on
the spectral lower bound specLB on discrepancy; the geometric properties of the minimum enclosing ellipsoid of
a convex body together with the restricted invertibility principle of Bourgain and Tzafriri are key in deriving the
lower bounds.
The next lemma captures the technical property of the decomposition of Algorithm 1 that allows us to prove
matching upper and lower error bounds for our dense and sparse case algorithms.
Lemma 5 Let di be the dimension of the span of Ui. Furthermore, for i < k, let Wi =
∑
j>i Uj, and let Wk = Uk.
For every i ≤ k, there exists a set Si ⊆ [N ], such that |Si| = Ω(di) and σ2min(WiWTi A|Si) = Ω(1) maxNj=1 ‖UTi aj‖22.
Proof: Let us, for ease of notation, assume that d is a power of 2. We prove that there exists a set S, |S| = Ω(d),
such that
σ2min(V V
TA|S) = Ω(1) max
j∈N
‖UT1 aj‖22. (13)
This proves the lemma for i = 1 (substitute Wi = V and di = d/2). Applying (13) inductively to V
TA establishes
the lemma for all i < k. In case i = k, observe that dk = 1 and we only need to show that the matrix UkU
T
k A
has a column with `2 norm at least maxj∈N ‖UTk aj‖2. This is trivially true since each column of UkUTk A has the
same `2 norm as the corresponding column of U
T
k A.
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Algorithm 1 Base Decomposition
Input A = (ai)
N
i=1 ∈ Rd×N (rankA = d);
Compute E = FBd2 , the minimum volume enclosing ellipsoid of K = AB1;
Let (ui)
d
i=1 be the (left) singular vectors of F corresponding to singular values σ1 ≥ . . . ≥ σd;
if d = 1 then
Output U1 = u1.
else
Let U1 = (ui)i>d/2 and V = (ui)i≤d/2;
Recursively compute a base decomposition V2, . . . , Vk of V
TA (k ≤ d1 + log de is the depth of the recursion);
For each i > 1, let Ui = V Vi;
Output {U1, . . . , Uk}.
end if
By applying an appropriate unitary transformation to the columns of A, we may assume that the major axes of
E are co-linear with the standard basis vectors of Rd, and, therefore, F is a diagonal matrix with Fii = σi. This
transformation comes without loss of generality, since it applies a unitary transformation to the columns of A
and V and does not affect the singular values of any matrix V V TA|S for any S ⊆ [N ]. For the rest of the proof
we assume that F is diagonal.
Since F is diagonal, ui is equal to ei, the i-th standard basis vector. Therefore U1 is diagonal and equal to the
projection onto ed/2+1, . . . , ed, and V is also diagonal and equal to the projection onto e1, . . . , ed/2. Consider
L = F−1K = F−1ABd1 (recall that we assumed that rankA = d and therefore F is non-singular). Since the
minimum enclosing ellipsoid of K is E = FBd2 , we have that the minimum enclosing ellipsoid of L is B
d
2 . Let
T = V V T be the projection onto e1, . . . , ed/2. Then, by Theorem 7, and because ‖T‖2F = d/2, we have that there
exists a set S of size |S| = Ω(d) such that σ2min(TF−1A|S) = Ω(1). We chose F , and therefore F−1, as well as T
to be diagonal matrices, so they all commute. Then, since T is a projection matrix,
σ2min(V V
TA|S) = σ2min(TA|S) = σ2min(FTF−1A|S) = σ2min(FTTF−1A|S)
≥ σ2min(FT )σ2min(TF−1A|S) = Ω(σ2d/2). (14)
Observe that, since K ⊆ E, we have
UT1 K ⊆ UT1 E = UT1 FBd2 ⊆ σd/2+1Bd2 .
Therefore, maxNj=1 ‖UT1 aj‖22 ≤ σ2d/2+1 ≤ σ2d/2. Substituting for σ2d/2 into (14) completes the proof. 
3.2 The Dense Case: Correlated Gaussian Noise
Our first result is an efficient algorithm whose expected error matches the spectral lower bound specLB up to
polylogarithmic factors and is therefore nearly optimal. This proves Theorem 1. The algorithm adds correlated
unbiased Gaussian noise to the exact answer Ax. The noise distribution is computed based on the decomposition
algorithm of the previous subsection.
Algorithm 2 Gaussian Noise Mechanism
Input (Public): query matrix A = (ai)
N
i=1 ∈ Rd×N (rankA = d);
Input (Private): database x ∈ RN
Let U1, . . . , Uk be base decomposition computed by Algorithm 1 on input A, where Ui is an orthonormal basis
for a space of dimension di;
Let c(ε, δ) =
1+
√
2 ln(1/δ)
ε .
For each i, let ri = max
N
j=1 ‖UTi aj‖2;
For each i, sample wi ∼ N(0, c(ε, δ))di ;
Output Ax+
√
k
∑k
i=1 riUiwi.
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Theorem 13 Let Mg(A, x) be the output of Algorithm 2 on input a d × N query matrix A and private input
x. Mg(A, x) is (ε, δ)-differentially private and for all small enough ε and all δ small enough with respect to ε
satisfies
errMg (A) = O(log
2 d log 1/δ) optε,δ(A,
d
ε
) = O(log2 d log 1/δ) optε,δ(A).
Notice that even though we assume rankA = d, this is without loss of generality: if rankA = r < d, we can
compute an orthonormal basis V for the range of A and apply the algorithm to A′ = V TA to compute an
approximation z˜ to A′x. We have that V A′x = V V TAx = Ax since V V T is a projection onto the range of A and
Ax belongs to that range. Then y˜ = V z˜ gives us an approximation of Ax satisfying ‖y˜ −Ax‖2 = ‖z˜ −A′x‖2.
We start the proof of Theorem 13 with the privacy analysis. For ease of notation, we assume throughout the
analysis that d is a power of 2.
Lemma 6 Mg(A, x) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof: The lemma follows from Corollary 9. Next we describe in detail why the corollary applies.
Let U1, . . . , Uk be the base decomposition computed by Algorithm 1 on input A. Let Vi be the subspace spanned
by the columns of Ui and let di be the dimension of Vi. The projection matrix onto Vi is UiUTi . Let Ei be
the ellipsoid Ui(riB
di
2 ) = FiB
di
2 (Fi is riUi). By the definition of ri, U
T
i K ⊆ riBdi2 , and therefore, ΠiK ⊆ Ei.
Mg(A, x) is distributed identically to Ax +
√
k
∑k
i=1 Fiwi. Therefore, by Corollary 9, Mg(A, x) satisfies (ε, δ)-
differential privacy. 
Lemma 7 For all small enough ε and all δ small enough with respect to ε, for all i,
E‖riUiwi‖22 ≤ O(log
1
δ
) optε,δ(A,
di
ε
),
where ri, Ui and wi are as defined in Algorithm 2.
Proof:
To upper bound E‖riUiwi‖22, observe that, since the columns of Ui are di pairwise orthogonal unit vectors,
‖riUiwi‖22 = r2i ‖wi‖22. Therefore, it follows that
E‖riUiwi‖22 = dic(ε, δ)2r2i = O(log(1/δ)
1
ε2
dr2i ). (15)
By (15), it is enough to lower bound optε,δ(A) by Ω(
1
ε2 dr
2
i ). As a first step we lower bound specLB(A). Then
the lower bound on optε,δ will follow from (6) and Lemma 3.
To lower bound specLB(A), we invoke Lemma 5. It follows from the lemma that for every i there exists a
projection matrix Πi = WiW
T
i and a set Si such that σ
2
min(ΠiA|Si) = Ω(r2i ), and, furthermore, |Si| = Ω(di).
Substituting into the the definition of specLB(A, di), we have that for all i.
specLB(A, di) ≥ |Si|σ2min(ΠiA|Si) = Ω(dir2i ).
Therefore, by (6), optc1,c2(A, di) = Ω(dir
2
i ) for all i. Finally, by Lemma 3, there exists a small enough δ = δ(ε),
for which optε,δ(A,
di
ε ) = Ω(
1
ε2 dir
2
i ), and this completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 13: The proof of the theorem follows from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. The privacy guarantee
is direct from Lemma 6. Next we prove that the error of Mg is near optimal.
Let w be the noise vector generated by Algorithm 2 so that w =
√
k
∑1+log d
i=1 riUiwi. We have errMg (A) = E‖w‖22.
We proceed to upper bound this quantity in terms of optε,δ(A).
By Lemma 7, for each wi, E‖riUiwi‖22 = O(log 1/δ) optε,δ(A). Since UTi Uj = 0 for all i 6= j, and k = O(log d),
we can bound E‖w‖22 as
E‖w‖22 = k
1+log d∑
i=1
E‖riUiwi‖22 = O(log d log 1/δ)
k∑
i=1
optε,δ(A,
di
ε
) = O(log2 d log 1/δ) optε,δ(A,
d
ε
)
This completes the proof. 
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3.3 The Sparse Case: Least Squares Estimation
In this subsection we present an algorithm with stronger accuracy guarantees than Algorithm 2: it is optimal for
any query matrix A and any database size bound n (Theorem 3). The algorithm combines the noise distribution
of Algorithm 2 with a least squares estimation step. Privacy is guaranteed by noise addition, while the least
squares estimation step reduces the error significantly when n = o(d/ε). The algorithm is shown as Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Least Squares Mechanism
Input (Public): query matrix A = (ai)
N
i=1 ∈ Rd×N (rankA = d); database size bound n
Input (Private): database x ∈ RN
Let U1, . . . , Uk be base decomposition computed by Algorithm 1 on input A, where Ui is an orthonormal basis
for a space of dimension di;
Let t be the largest integer such that dt ≥ εn;
Let X =
∑t
i=1 Ui and Y =
∑k
i=t+1 Ui;
Call Algorithm 2 to compute y˜ =Mg(A, x);
Let y˜1 = XX
T y˜ and y˜2 = Y Y
T y˜;
Let yˆ1 = arg min{‖y˜1 − yˆ1‖22 : yˆ1 ∈ nXXTK}, where K = AB1.
Output yˆ1 + y˜2.
Theorem 14 LetM`(A, x, n) be the output of Algorithm 3 on input a d×N query matrix A, database size bound
n and private input x. M`(A, x) is (ε, δ)-differentially private and for all small enough ε and all δ small enough
with respect to ε satisfies
errM`(A) = O(log
3/2 d
√
logN log(1/δ) + log2 d log(1/δ)) optε,δ(A,n).
Lemma 8 M`(A, x, n) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof: The output ofM`(A, x, n) is a deterministic function of the output ofMg(A, x). By Lemma 6,Mg(A, x)
satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy, and, therefore, by Lemma 2 (i.e. the post-processing property of differential
privacy), M`(A, x, n) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy. 
Lemma 9 Let Ui and t be as defined in Algorithm 3 and let ri and wi be as defined in Algorithm 2. Then
EmaxNj=1 n|〈aj , riUiwi〉| ≤ O(
√
logN log(1/δ)) optε,δ(A,n).
Proof:
First we upper bound EmaxNj=1 n|〈aj , riUiwi〉|. After rearranging the terms, we have 〈aj , riUiwi〉 = 〈UTi aj , riwi〉
for any i and j. By the definition of ri, ‖UTi aj‖2 ≤ ri. Therefore, 〈UTi aj , riwi〉 is a Gaussian random variable
with mean 0 and standard deviation at most r2i c(ε, δ). Using standard bounds on the expected maximum of N
Gaussians (e.g. using a Chernoff bound and a union bound), we have that
E Nmax
j=1
n|〈aj , riUiwi〉| = nE Nmax
j=1
|〈UTi aj , riwi〉|
= O(
√
logNc(ε, δ)nr2i )
= O(
√
logN log(1/δ)
1
ε
nr2i ).
To finish the proof of the lemma, we need to lower bound optε,δ(A,n) by Ω(
1
εnr
2
i ). We will use Lemma 5 to lower
bound specLB(A, εn) by Ω(εnr2i ) and then we will invoke Lemma 3 to get the right dependence on ε.
By Lemma 5, for every i there exists a projection matrix Πi = WiW
T
i and a set Si such that σ
2
min(ΠiA|Si) = Ω(r2i ),
and, furthermore, |Si| = Ω(di). By the definition of t, for all i ≤ t, di ≥ εn, and, therefore, |Si| = Ω(εn). Take
Ti ⊆ Si to be an arbitrary subset of Si of size Ω(εn). The smallest singular value of ΠiA|Si is a lower bound on
the smallest singular value of ΠiA|Ti :
σmin(ΠiA|Ti) = min
x:‖x‖2=1
‖(ΠiA|Ti)x‖2 = min
x:‖x‖2=1
supp(x)⊆Ti
‖(ΠiA|Si)x‖2
≥ min
x:‖x‖2=1
‖(ΠiA|Si)x‖2 = σmin(ΠiA|Si),
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where supp(x) is the subset of coordinates on which x is nonzero. Therefore, σ2min(ΠiA|Ti) = Ω(r2i ). Substituting
into the definition of specLB(A, εn), we have
specLB(A, εn) = Ω(|Ti|σmin(ΠiA|Ti)) = Ω(εnr2i ).
Therefore, by (6), optc1,c2(A, εn) = Ω(εnr
2
i ) for all i ≤ t. Finally, by Lemma 3, there exists a small enough
δ = δ(ε), for which optε,δ(A,n) = Ω(
n
ε r
2
i ), and this completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 14: The privacy guarantee is direct from Lemma 8. Next we prove that the error of M` is
near optimal.
We will bound errM`(A,n) by bounding E‖yˆ1 + y˜2−Ax‖22 for any x. Let us fix x and define y = Ax; furthermore,
define y1 = XX
T y and y2 = Y Y
T y. By the Pythagorean theorem, we can write
E‖yˆ1 + y˜2 − y‖22 = E‖yˆ1 − y1‖22 + E‖y˜2 − y2‖22. (16)
We show that the first term on the right hand side of (16) is at most O(log3/2 d
√
logN log(1/δ)) optε,δ(A,n) and
the second term is O(log2 d log(1/δ)) optε,δ(A,n) .
The bound on E‖y˜2−y2‖22 follows from Theorem 13. More precisely, Y T y˜2 is distributed identically to the output
of Mg(Y TA, x), and by Theorem 13,
E‖y˜2 − y2‖22 = E‖Y T y˜2 − Y TAx‖22 = O(log2 d
√
logN log(1/δ)) optε,δ(A,
dt+1
ε
).
Since, by the definition of t, dt+1ε < n, we have the desired bound.
The bound on E‖yˆ1− y1‖22 follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 9. We will use the notations for wi, and ri defined
in Algorithm 2. Let L = nXXTK; by Lemma 1,
E‖yˆ1 − y1‖22 ≤ 4E‖yˆ1 − y1‖L◦ = 4E
N
max
j=1
|〈naj , XXT (y˜ − y)〉|.
The last equality follows from the definition of the dual norm ‖ · ‖L◦ and from the fact that L is a polytope with
vertices {aj}Nj=1, so any linear functional on L is maximized at one of the vertices. From the fact that for all
i 6= j we have UTi Uj = 0, from the triangle inequality, and from Lemma 9, we derive
E Nmax
j=1
|〈naj , XXT (y˜ − y)〉| = E Nmax
j=1
n|
√
k
t∑
i=1
〈aj , riUiwi〉|
≤
√
k
t∑
i=1
E Nmax
j=1
n|〈aj , riUiwi〉|
≤ O(
√
kt
√
logN log(1/δ)) optε,δ(A,n)
= O(log3/2 d
√
logN log(1/δ)) optε,δ(A,n).
This completes the proof. 
3.4 Computational Complexity
In this subsection we consider the computational complexity of our algorithms. We pay special attention to
approximating the minimum enclosing ellipsoid of a polytope and computing least squares estimators. For both
problems we need to go into the properties of known approximation algorithms in order to verify that the
approximations are sufficient to guarantee that our algorithms can be implemented in polynomial time without
hurting their near-optimality.
3.4.1 Minimum Enclosing Ellipsoid
Computationally the most expensive step of the base decomposition algorithm (Algorithm 1) is computing the
minimum enclosing ellipsoid E of K. Computing the exact MEE can be costly: the fastest known algorithms have
complexity on the order of dO(d)N [AS93]. However, for our purposes it is enough to compute an approximation
of E in Banach-Mazur distance, i.e. some ellipsoid E′ satisfying 1CE
′ ⊆ E ⊆ E′ for an absolute constant
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C. Known approximation algorithms for MME guarantee that their output is an enclosing ellipsoid with volume
approximately equal to that of the MEE [Kha96,TY07]. It is not immediately clear whether such an approximation
is also a Banach-Mazur approximation. However, we can use the fact that the algorithms in [Kha96, KY05,
TY07] output an ellipsoid E′ satisfying approximate complimentary slackness conditions and show that ΠE′
approximates ΠE in Banach-Mazur sense for some projection Π onto a subspace of dimension Ω(d). This suffices
for a slightly weaker version of Lemma 5.
We begin with a definition. Let’s define a vector p ∈ [0, 1]N to be C-optimal for A = (ai)Ni=1 if the following
conditions are satisfied:
• ∑Ni=1 pi = 1;
• for all i ∈ [N ], aTi (APAT )−1ai ≤ C · d where P = diag(p) (we use this notation throughout this section).
The C-optimality conditions are a relaxation of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of a formulation of the
MEE problem as convex program. The approximation algorithm for MEE due to Khachiyan [Kha96], and later
follow up work [KY05, TY07] compute a C-optimal p and output an approximate MEE ellipsoid E(p) = {x :
xT (APAT )−1x ≤ Cd}. The running time of the algorithm in [TY07] is O˜(d2N), where the O˜ notation suppresses
dependence on C as well as polylogarithmic terms.
C-optimality implies the following property of the the ellipsoid E(p) which is key to our analysis.
Lemma 10 Let E∗ = F ∗Bd2 be the minimum enclosing ellipsoid of K = sym{ai}Ni=1, and let p be C-optimal for
A = (ai)
N
i=1. Let also E(p) = {x : xT (APAT )−1x ≤ Cd} = F (p)Bd2 . Then,
σ2d/2(F (p)) ≤ 4Cσ2d/4(F ∗).
Proof: Let G = (F ∗)−1. Since GE∗ = Bd2 , we have that the MEE of GK is the unit ball, and, therefore,
‖Gai‖22 ≤ 1 for all i ∈ [N ]. Since F (p)F (p)T = Cd ·APAT , we have
1
d
N∑
i=1
σ2i (GF (p)) =
1
d
tr(GF (p)F (p)TGT )
= Ctr(GAPATGT )
= C
N∑
i=1
pi‖Gai‖22 ≤ C.
By Markov’s inequality, σ2d/4(GF (p)) ≤ 4C. Let Π1 be the projection operator onto the subspace spanned by the
left singular vectors of GF (p) corresponding to σd/4(GF (p)), . . . , σd(GF (p)). We have Π1GE(p) ⊆ 2C1/2Π1Bd2 .
Multiplying on both sides by F ∗, we get
F ∗Π1GE(p) ⊆ 2C1/2F ∗Π1Bd2 .
Let Π2 be the matrix Π2 = G
−1Π1G = F ∗Π1G. Since Π2 is similar to Π1, it is also a projection matrix onto a
3d/4 dimensional subspace. We have that F ∗Π1 = Π2F ∗, and therefore
Π2E(p) ⊆ 2C1/2Π2E∗.
Define H = 4CF ∗(F ∗)T − F (p)F (p)T . The inclusion above is equivalent to the positive semidefiniteness of the
matrix Π2HΠ
T
2 . As Π2 is a projection onto a 3d/4 dimensional subspace, by the standard minimax characteriza-
tion of eigenvalues we have λ3d/4(H) ≥ 0. We recall the (dual) Weyl inequalities for symmetric d× d matrices X
and Y :
λi(X) + λj(Y ) ≤ λi+j−d(X + Y ).
The inequalities are standard and follow from the minimax characterization of eigenvalues and dimension counting
arguments — see, e.g. Chapter 1 in [Tao12]. Substituting X = H and Y = F (p)F (p)T , i = 3d/4 and j = d/2, we
have the inequality
σ2d/2(F (p)) = λd/2(F (p)F (p)
T ) ≤ λd/4(4CF ∗(F ∗)T ) = 4Cσ2d/4(F ∗),
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and the proof is complete. 
Finally we give an analogue of Lemma 5 for the variant of the base decomposition algorithm that uses an
approximate MEE. The proof follows from Lemma 10 and the arguments used to prove Lemma 5. We omit a full
proof here.
Lemma 11 Consider a variant of Algorithm 1 that, at each step, uses E(p) = {x : xT (APAT )−1x ≤ Cd} =
F (p)Bd2 , where p is O(1)-optimal for A, rather than the minimum enclosing ellipsoid E = FB
d
2 . Let di be the
dimension of the span of Ui. For any i there exists a subspace Wi of dimension Ω(di) and a set Si ⊆ [N ] of size
|Si| = Ω(di), such that σ2min(WiWTi A|Si) = Ω(1) maxNj=1 ‖UTi aj‖22.
One can verify that in all our proofs we can substitute Lemma 11 for Lemma 5 without changing the asymptotics
of our lower and upper bounds. Therefore, in all our algorithms we can use the variant of Algorithm 1 from
Lemma 11 without compromising near-optimality. This variant of Algorithm 1 runs in time dO(1)N .
Notice that the base decomposition can be reused for different databases, as long as the query matrix A stays
unchanged; once the decomposition is computed the rest of the algorithm is very efficient: it involves some standard
algebraic computations and sampling from an O(d)-dimensional gaussian distribution. Furthermore, any ellipsoid
E′ containing K suffices for privacy, and one may use heuristic approximations to the MEE problem.
3.4.2 Least Squares Estimator
Except for base decomposition, the other potentially computationally expensive step in Algorithm 3 is the com-
putation of a least squares estimator yˆ1. This is a quadratic minimization problem, and can be approximated by
the simple Frank-Wolfe gradient descent algorithm [FW56]. In particular, for a point yˆ′ such that ‖yˆ′ − y‖22 ≤
minyˆ∈L ‖yˆ′ − y‖22+α, Lemma 1 holds to within an additive approximation factor α, i.e. ‖yˆ′−y‖22 ≤ 4‖w‖L◦+α. We
call such a point yˆ′ an α additive approximation to the least squares estimator problem. By the analysis of Clark-
son [Cla10], T iterations of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm give an additive approximation where α ≤ 4C(L)/(T + 3),
for C(L) ≤ supu,v∈L |〈u, u− v〉|. In our case L = nXXTK. In order to have near optimality for Algorithm 3, an
additive approximation α ≤∑ti=1 nr2i suffices. Using the triangle inequality and Cauchy-Schwarz, we can bound
C(L) for L = nXXTK as
C(L) ≤
t∑
i=1
sup
u,v∈nUiUTi K
〈uT , u− v〉 ≤
t∑
i=1
2n2r2i .
Therefore, T = O(n) iterations of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm suffice. Since each iteration of the algorithm
involves N dot product computations and solving a homogeneous linear system in at most d variables and at
most d equations, it follows that an approximate version of Algorithm 3 with unchanged asymptotic optimality
guarantees can be implemented in time dO(1)Nn.
We note that the approximation algorithm of Khachiyan for the MEE problem, as well as its modification
in [TY07], can also be interpreted as instances of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm (see [TY07] for details).
4 Results for Pure Privacy
Our geometric approach to approximate privacy allows us to better understand the optimal error required for
approximate privacy vs. that required for pure privacy. Our first result bounds the gap between the optimal error
bounds for the two notions of privacy in the dense case. Then we extend these ideas and give a (ε, 0)-differentially
private algorithm which nearly matches the guarantees of Algorithm 3 for sparse databases.
4.1 The Cost of Pure Privacy
In this subsection we investigate the worst-case gap between optε,δ(A) (for small enough δ > 0) and optε,0(A)
over all query matrices A. At the core of our analysis is a natural geometric fact: for any symmetric polytope
K with N vertices in d-dimensional space we can find a subset of d vertices of K whose symmetric convex hull
has volume radius at most a factor O(
√
log(N/d)) smaller than the volume radius of K. Our proof of this fact
goes through analyzing the contact points of K with its minimum enclosing volume ellipsoid, and a bound on the
volume of polytopes with few vertices.
Theorem 15 Let K = sym{a1, . . . , aN} ⊆ Rd and let E be an ellipsoid of minimal volume containing K. There
exists a set S ⊆ [N ] of size d such that the matrix A|S = (ai)i∈S satisfies det(A|S)1/d = Ω(vrad(E)).
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For the proof of 15 we will use John’s theorem (Theorem 6) and the following elementary algebraic result.
Lemma 12 Let u1, . . . , um be d-dimensional unit vectors and let c1, . . . , cm be positive reals such that∑
ciuiu
T
i = I. (17)
Then there exists a set S ⊆ [m] of size d such that the matrix U = (ui)i∈S satisfies |det(U)|1/d = Ω(1).
Proof: Notice that tr(uiu
T
i ) = ‖ui‖22 = 1 for all i. By taking traces of both sides of (17), we have
∑
ci = d.
Let U = (ui)
m
i=1 and let C be the m × m diagonal matrix with (ci)mi=1 on the diagonal. Then we can write
I =
∑
ciuiu
T
i = UCU
T . By the Binet-Cauchy formula for the determinant,
1 = det(UCU) =
∑
S⊆[m]:|S|=d
∏
i∈S
ci det(U |S)2
≤ max
S⊆[m]:|S|=d
det(U |S)2
∑
S⊆[m]:|S|=d
∏
i∈S
ci
≤ max
S⊆[m]:|S|=d
det(U |S)2 1
d!
(
m∑
i=1
ci
)d
(18)
≤ max
S⊆[m]:|S|=d
det(U |S)2 d
d
d!
The inequality (18) follows since each term
∏
i∈S ci appears d! times in the expansion of (
∑
ci)
d and all other terms
in the expansion are positive. Using the inequality d! ≥ (d/e)d, we have that maxS⊆[m]:|S|=d det(U |S)2/d ≥ 1/e,
and this completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 15: We can write the minimum enclosing ellipsoid E as vrad(E)FB2 where F is a linear map
with determinant 1. Since F−1 does not change volumes, B2 is a minimal volume ellipsoid of vrad(E)−1F−1K.
Also, for any A|S = (ai)i∈S , where S ⊆ [N ], we have
det(A|S) = vrad(E)d det(vrad(E)−1F−1A|S).
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that for L = sym{u1, . . . , uN} such that B2 is the minimal volume ellipsoid of L,
there exists a set S ⊆ [N ] such that the matrix U |S = (ui)i∈S satisfies det(U |S)1/d = Ω(1). Since, by convexity,
the contact points L∩B2 of L are a subset of u1, . . . , uN , the statement follows from Theorem 6 and Lemma 12.

Combined with the following theorem of Ba´ra´ny and Fu¨redi [BF88], and also Gluskin [Glu07] (with sharper
bounds), Theorem 15 implies the corollary that for any d-dimensional symmetric polytope one can find a set of
d vertices whose symmetric convex hull captures a significant fraction of the volume of the polytope.
Theorem 16 ( [BF88,Glu07]) Let K = sym{a1, . . . , aN} and let E be an ellipsoid containing K. Then
vrad(K) ≤ O
(√
log(N/d)
d
)
vrad(E).
Corollary 1 For any K = sym{a1, . . . , aN} there exists a set S ⊆ [N ] such that
det((ai)i∈S)1/d = Ω
(√
d
log(N/d)
)
vrad(K).
Finally, we describe the application to differential privacy. By Corollary 1, volLB(A, ε) = O( 1ε2 log(N/d)) detLB(A, d).
Also, by (11), detLB(A, d) = O(log2 d) optc1,c2(A, d). Finally, Lemma 3 implies that optc1,c2(A, d) ≤ ε2 optε,δ(A, d/ε)
for δ small enough with respect to ε. Putting all this together and using Theorem12, we have the following theorem
(Theorem 2).
Theorem 17 For small enough ε and all δ small enough with respect to ε, for any d×N real matrix A we have
optε,0(A) = O(log
3 d) volLB(A, ε) = O(log5 d log(N/d)) optε,δ(A,
d
ε
).
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4.2 Sparse Case under Pure Privacy
We further extend our results from Section 3.3 and show an efficient (ε, 0)-differentially private algorithm which,
on input any query matrix A and any database size bound n, nearly matches optε,0(A,n). This proves our main
Theorem 4. In fact, our result is stronger: we show an (ε, 0)-differentially private mechanism whose error nearly
matches optε,δ(A,n) for all δ small enough with respect to ε. Thus, the result of this subsection can be seen as
a generalization of Theorem 17 to the sparse databases regime.
Our algorithm for sparse databases under pure privacy closely follows Algorithm 3: we add noise from a dis-
tribution that is tailored to A but oblivious to the database x; then we use least squares estimation to reduce
error on sparse databases. However, Gaussian noise does not preserve (ε, 0)-differential privacy, and we need to
use a different noise distribution. Intuitively, one expects that adding noise sampled from a near-optimal distri-
bution [HT10, BDKT12] and then computing a least squares estimator would be nearly optimal, analogously to
Algorithm 3. We are not currently able to analyze the error of this algorithm, but instead we analyze a variant
of Algorithm 3 where the Gaussian distribution is simply substituted with the generalized K-norm distribution
from [HT10]. Intuitively, we are able to show that the generalized K-norm distribution “approximates a Gaus-
sian” well enough for our analysis to go through. A main tool in our analysis is a classical concentration of
measure inequality from convex geometry.
We begin with a slight generalization of the main upper bound result of Hardt and Talwar [HT10]. This gener-
alization follows directly from the methods used in [HT10] with only minor modifications in the proofs. We omit
a full derivation here. Also, while the methods of Hardt and Talwar will lead to a proof conditional on the truth
of the Hyperplane conjecture from convex geometry, using the ideas of Bhaskara et al. [BDKT12] the result can
be made unconditional.
Theorem 18 ( [HT10,BDKT12]) Let A = (ai)
N
i=1 be an d × N real matrix and let K = sym{ai}Ni=1. There
exists an efficiently computable and efficiently sampleable distributionW(A, ε) such that the following claims hold:
1. the algorithm MK which on input x outputs Ax+ w for w ∼ W(A, ε) satisfies (ε, 0)-differential privacy;
2. W(A, ε) is identical to the distribution of the random variable m∑m`=1 w` where m = O(log d), and w` is a
sample from a log concave distribution with support lying in a subspace V` of Rd of dimension d`;
3. V` and V`′ for `′ 6= ` are orthogonal, and the union of {V`}m`=1 spans Rd;
4. let M` = M`(A, ε) = Em2w`wT` be the correlation matrix of mw` and let Π` be the projection matrix onto
span{Vj}mj=`; then
λmax(M`) ≤ O(log2 d)d`
ε2
vrad(Π`K)
2,
where λmax(M`) is the largest eigenvalue of M`.
Using the distribution W(A, ε), we define our near optimal sparse-case algorithm satisfying pure differential
privacy as Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Least Squares Mechanism: Pure Privacy
Input (Public): query matrix A = (ai)
N
i=1 ∈ Rd×N (rankA = d); database size bound n
Input (Private): database x ∈ RN
Let U1, . . . , Uk be base decomposition computed by Algorithm 1 on input A, where Ui is an orthonormal basis
for a space of dimension di;
Let t be the largest integer such that dt ≥ εn;
for all i ≤ t do
Compute y˜i = Ui(U
T
i Ax+ wi) where wi ∼ W(UTi A, εt+1 ).
end for
Let y˜′ =
∑t
i=1 y˜i
Let X =
∑t
i=1 Ui and Y =
∑k
i=t+1 Ui;
Compute y˜′′ = Y (Y TAx+ w′′) where w′′ ∼ W(Y TA, εt+1 );
Compute yˆ′ = arg min{‖y˜′ − yˆ′‖22 : yˆ1 ∈ nXXTK}, where K = AB1.
Output yˆ′ + y˜′′.
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Theorem 19 Let Mp(A, x, n) be the output of Algorithm 4 on input a d × N query matrix A, database size
bound n and private input x. Mp(A, x, n) is (ε, 0)-differentially private and for all small enough ε and all δ small
enough with respect to ε satisfies
errMp(A) = O(log
4 d log3/2N) optε,δ(A,n) +O(log
5 d logN) optε,0(A,n);
errMp(A) = O(log
4 d log3/2N + log7 d logN) optε,δ(A,n).
Once again privacy follows by a straightforward argument from the privacy of the underlying noise-adding mech-
anism, in this case the generalized K-norm mechanism.
Lemma 13 Mp(A, x, n) satisfies (ε, 0)-differential privacy.
Proof: Mp(A, x, n) is a deterministic function of y˜1, . . . , y˜t and y˜′′. Each of these quantities is the output of an
algorithm satisfying ( εt+1 , 0)-differential privacy (by Theorem 18, claim 1). Therefore, by Lemma 2, Mp(A, x, n)
satisfies (ε, 0)-differential privacy. 
Next we prove the main technical lemma we need in order to show near optimality. The analysis is very similar
to that of Lemma 9. The main technical challenge is to show that the distribution W has all the properties we
needed from the Gaussian distribution: covariance with bounded operator norm and exponential concentration.
We use ideas from Section 4.1 and the following variant of a classical concentration of measure inequality, due to
Borell [Bor75] (proved in the appendix).
Theorem 20 Let µ be a log-concave distribution over Rd. Assume that A is a symmetric convex subset of Rd
such that µ(A) = θ ≥ 23 . Then, for every t > 1 we have
µ[(tA)c] ≤ 2−(t+1)/2
We are now ready to prove the counterpart of Lemma 9 for Mp.
Lemma 14 Let Ui, t, and wi be as defined in Algorithm 4 . For all small enough ε and all δ small enough with
respect to ε, EmaxNj=1 n|〈aj ,
∑t
i=1 Uiwi〉| ≤ O(log4 d log3/2N) optε,δ(A,n).
Proof: As in Algorithm 3, we define ri = max
N
j=1 ‖UTi aj‖2. Equivalently ri is the radius of the smallest di-
dimensional ball which contains UTi K. In the proof of Lemma 9 we argued that optε,δ(A,n) = Ω(
n
ε r
2
i ) for all
small enough ε and all δ small enough with respect to ε.
By Theorem 18, we can write wi as mi
∑mi
`=1 wi` where wi` is a sample from a log concave distribution over a
subspace Vi` and mi = O(log di). Furthermore, all wi` for a fixed i are mutually orthogonal. Finally, letting Πi`
be the projection matrix onto span{Vi`}mi`=1 and Mi` be the covariance matrix of miwi`, we have
λmax(Mi`) ≤ O(log2 d)di`t
2
2
vrad(Πi`U
T
i K)
2. (19)
Therefore, for any aj , we can derive the following bound:
En2|〈aj , Uiwi〉|2 = n2E|〈UTi aj , wi〉|2
≤ n2mi
mi∑
`=1
E|〈UTi aj ,miwi`〉|2
= n2mi
mi∑
`=1
(UTi aj)
TMi`(U
T
i aj)
≤ n2mi
mi∑
`=1
‖UTi aj‖22λmax(Mi`)
≤ O(log5 d)n2
mi∑
`=1
1
ε2
r2i di` vrad(Πi`U
T
i K)
2.
The first bound above follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the last bound follows from (19). To
bound di` vrad(Πi`U
T
i K)
2, recall that UTi K is contained in a ball of radius ri, and therefore so is Πi`U
T
i K for all
22
`. Therefore, by Theorem 16, vrad(Πi`U
T
i K)
2 = O((log(N/di`))/di`)r
2
i . Substituting into the bound above and
recalling that optε,δ(A,n) = Ω(
n
ε r
2
i ), we get
En2|〈aj , Uiwi〉|2 = O(log6 d log(N/d)) optε,δ(A,n)2.
Thus applying Cauchy Schwarz once again, we conclude
En2|〈aj ,
t∑
i=1
Uiwi〉|2 ≤ t ·
t∑
i=1
En2|〈aj , Uiwi〉|2 = O(log8 d log(N/d) optε,δ(A,n)).
For any j, the set {w : |〈UTi aj ,
∑
i wi〉| ≤ T} is symmetric and convex for any bound T . Then, by Chebyshev’s
inequality, and Theorem 20 there exists a constant C such that for any i, j and α > 2
Pr[n|〈UTi aj , wi〉| > Cα logN log4 d
√
log(N/d)
n
ε
r2i ] < N
−α.
Using a union bound and taking expectations completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 19: The privacy guarantee follows from Lemmas 13. By Lemma 14 analogously to the
proof of Theorem 14, we can conclude that
E[‖yˆ′ −XXTAx‖22] ≤ 4E
N
max
j=1
n|〈aj ,
t∑
i=1
Uiwi〉| ≤ O(log4 d log3/2N) optε,δ(A,n).
Moreover, by Theorem 12,
E[‖y˜′′ − Y Y TAx‖22] ≤ O(log3 d) volLB(Y Y TA,
ε
t+ 1
)
= O(t2 log3 d) optε,0(Y Y
TA,
dt
ε
)
= O(log5 d) optε,0(A,n).
The last bound follows since Y Y T is a projection matrix, dt ≤ nε and t = O(log d). Also, by Theorem 17,
volLB(Y Y TA, εt+1 ) = O(t
2 log2 d log(N/dt)) optε,δ(Y Y
TA, dtε ), and therefore we have E[‖y˜′′ − Y Y TAx‖22] =
O(log7 d log(N/d)) optε,δ(A,n).
Pythagoras theorem then implies the result. 
5 Universal bounds
For d linear sensitivity 1 queries, there are known universal bounds on errε,δ(A,n) and errε,0(A,n). We note
that the sensitivity 1 bound implies that the `2 norm of each column is at most
√
d. This in turn allows us
to prove an upper bound on the spectral lower bound, so that the relative guarantee provided by Theorems 13
and 14 can be translated to an absolute one. The resulting bounds can be improved by polylogarithmic factors,
by using natural simplifications of the relative-error mechanisms and analyzing them directly. We next present
these simplifications. The average per query error bounds resulting from our mechanisms match the best known
bounds for (ε, δ)-differential privacy, and improve on the best known bounds for pure differential privacy.
For (ε, δ)-differential privacy , the best known universal upper bound when A ∈ [0, 1]d×N for the total `22 error is
O(nd log d
√
logN log(1/δ)/), given by [GRU12]. We note that when A ∈ [0, 1]d×N , one can use B(0,√d) as an
enclosing ellipsoid for K. The following simple mechanism is easily seen to be (ε, δ)-DP.
Theorem 21 The mechanism Ms of Algorithm 5 is (ε, δ)-differentially private and satisfies
errMs(A) ≤ O(nd log(1/δ)
√
logN/ε)
Proof: The privacy of the mechanism is immediate from Lemma 4. To analyze the error, we use Lemma 1 and
the fact that L = nK to bound
errMs(A) = E[‖yˆ −Ax‖22] ≤ 4n‖w‖K◦ = 4nE
N
max
j=1
|〈aj , w〉|,
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Algorithm 5 Simple Noise + Least Squares Mechanism
Input Public Input: query matrix A = (ai)
N
i=1 ∈ [0, 1]d×N
Input Private Input: database x ∈ RN
Let c(ε, δ) =
1+
√
2 ln(1/δ)
ε .
Let r = maxNj=1 ‖aj‖2;
Sample w ∼ N(0, c(ε, δ))d;
Let y˜ = Ax+ rw.
Let yˆ = arg min{‖y˜ − yˆ‖22 : yˆ ∈ nK}, where K = AB1.
Output yˆ
where {aj}Nj=1 are columns of A. We have used the fact that the ‖w‖K◦ = maxa∈K〈a,w〉 is attained at one of
the vertices of K. Since each 〈aj , w〉 is a Gaussian with variance r4c(ε, δ)2, |〈aj , w〉| exceeds r2c(ε, δ)
√
t logN
with probability at most 1Nt . Taking a union bound, we conclude that this expectation of the maximum is
O(r2c(ε, δ)
√
logN). Recall that r = maxNj=1 ‖aj‖2 ≤
√
d. It follows that
errMs(A) ≤ O(ndc(ε, δ)
√
logN)

Comparing with [GRU12], our bound is better by an O(log d) factor. However, the previous bound is stronger in
that it guarantees expected squared error Oε,δ(n
√
logN log d) for every query, while we can only bound the total
`22 error.
For getting pure ε-DP, we simply substitute the generalized K-norm distribution guaranteed by Theorem 18
instead of the Gaussian noise.
Algorithm 6 K-norm Noise + Least Squares Mechanism
Input Public Input: query matrix A = (ai)
N
i=1 ∈ [0, 1]d×N
Input Private Input: database x ∈ RN
Let y˜ = Ax+ w where w ∼ W(A, ε).
Let yˆ = arg min{‖y˜ − yˆ‖22 : yˆ ∈ nK}, where K = AB1.
Output yˆ
We first observe an upper bound on the volume radius of projections of K.
Lemma 15 Let A ∈ [0, 1]d×N and let K = sym{a1, . . . , aN}. Let Π(k) be a rank k orthogonal projection that
maps Rd to Rk. Then
vrad(Π(k)K) ≤ O
(√
log(N/k)
k
)√
d
Proof: Since each column of A has `2 norm at most
√
d, Π(k)K is contained in a ball of radius
√
d. Theorem 16
then immediately implies the claimed bound. 
Now we show that Algorithm 6 achieves the bound claimed in Theorem 5.
Theorem 22 The mechanism Msp of Algorithm 6 is (ε, 0)-differentially private and satisfies
errMsp(A) ≤ O(ndε−1 log2 d log
3
2 N)
Proof: The privacy property follows from Theorem 18 and the fact that post-processing preserves (ε, 0)-
differential privacy. To prove the error bound, we need to upper bound Ew[‖w‖K◦ ] for a polytope K ⊆ <d
with N vertices, where w is drawn from W(A, ε). It therefore suffices to bound Ew[maxNi=1 |〈ai, w〉|].
By Theorem 18, we can write w as
∑m
`=1mw` where w` is drawn from a log concave distribution and m = O(log d).
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For a fixed `,
E[|〈ai,mw`〉|2] = aTi M`ai
≤ ‖ai‖2 · λmax(M`)
≤ O(d log2 d) 1
ε2
d` vrad(Π`K)
2.
By lemma 15, this is at most O
(
d log2 d log(N/d`)d/ε
2
) ≤ O(d2ε2 log2 d logN) . Then by Cauchy-Schwarz,
E[|〈ai,
m∑
`=1
mw`〉|2] ≤ m ·
m∑
`=1
E[|〈ai,mw`〉|2]
≤ O(d
2
ε2
log4 d logN)
By Theorem 20, Pr[|〈ai,
∑
` w`〉| ≥ t logN · O(dε log2 d
√
logN) ≤ N−Ω(t). It follows that Ew[‖w‖K◦ ] is bounded
by O(dε log
2 d log
3
2 N).
It then follows that E[‖yˆ −Ax‖22 is O(ndε−1 log2 d log
3
2 N). 
6 Extensions
In this section we describe a couple of extensions to our results. We show how to translate our optimality
guarantees for total squared error in the dense case regime to worst case error over queries using the minimax
theorem. We further show that our nearly optimal efficient mechanism in the dense case regime implies a
polylogarithmic approximation to hereditary discrepancy.
6.1 Expected `∞ Error
For i ∈ [d], let a(i) denote the ith row of A and let M(x)i denote the ith coordinate of the answer M(x). Let
err`∞M (A) = maxx∈RN E[‖Ax−M(x)‖∞] denote the worst case (over databases) expected `∞ error of a mechanism
for a query A. Here as usual, the expectation is taken over the internal coin tosses of M. Thus we measure the
expected worst case error E[maxi |〈a(i), x〉 −M(x)i|]. Let opt`∞(A) = minM:M is (ε,δ)−DP err`∞M (A) denote the
minimum `∞ error over all (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms. In the dense case, our results can be extended
to the `∞ error at the cost of an additional O(log d) loss in the competitive ratio.
We derive such an extension in two steps. First, we give a mechanism for which the worst case expected squared
error maxi E[|〈a(i), x〉 −M(x)i|2] is small. We then use this mechanism as a blackbox to derive one which has
small expected `∞ error. For a mechanism M, let EM,Ai = E[|〈a(i), x〉 −M(x)i|2] denote the expected squared
error of the mechanism in the ith coordinate.
Theorem 23 Let A ∈ Rd×N , ε, δ be given. There is an (ε, δ)-DP mechanism Mwe, and a non-negative diagonal
matrix P with tr(P 2) = 1 such that for all i ∈ [d],
EMwe,Ai ≤ O(log2 d log 1/δ) specLB(PA) ≤ O(log2 d log 1/δ)(opt`∞(A))2
Proof: Recall that for any A, the mechanism MAg of Section 3.2 is (ε, δ)-DP and has total expected `22 error
at most β , O(log2 log 1/δ) times the lower bound specLB(A). We will use this mechanism as a subroutine to
derive Mwe.
Let (p1, p2, . . . , pd) denote a probability distribution so that pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1. Let P denote a diagonal matrix
with entries
√
pi. It is easy to see that err
`22
M(PA) =
∑
i piE
M,A
i . It follows that opt
`22
,δ(PA) ≤ (opt`∞(A))2: indeed
the mechanism M achieving opt`∞(A) gives this error bound.
Thus the mechanism MPAg satisfies
err
`22
MPAg (PA) ≤ β specLB(PA) ≤ β opt
`22(PA).
It follows that
∑
i piE
MPAg ,A
i is β · (opt`∞(A))2. Consider a two-player zero sum game where the row-player
selects a query a(i) from A, and the column player picks an (ε, δ)-DP mechanismM and must pay the row player
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EM,Ai . The above discussion shows that for any randomized strategy (given by P ) of the row player, the column
player has a strategy that guarantees payoff at most β · (opt`∞(A))2. By the minimax theorem, this also upper
bounds the value of the game. Moreover, using standard constructive versions of the minimax theorems (see
e.g. [AHK12]), one can come up with such a distribution D over O(d log d) (ε, δ)-DP mechanisms, and a P such
that for all i ∈ [d],
EM∼D[EM,Ai ] ≤ 2β specLB(PA) ≤ 2β(opt`∞(A))2.
Recall that the mechanismMPAg is of the form Ax+w where w is a noise vector whose distribution is independent
of x. Thus the pair (D, P ) can be computed without looking at the database x. Therefore, the mechanism Mwe
that samples a M from D and runs it on x is itself (ε, δ)-DP. The theorem follows. 
Using the above result, we can now construct a mechanism that has small expected worse case error.
Theorem 24 Let A ∈ Rd×N , ε, δ be given. There is an (ε, δ)-DP mechanism Mew, and a non-negative diagonal
matrix P with tr(P 2) = 1 such that
(err`∞Mew(A))
2 ≤ O(log4 d log((log d)/δ)) · specLB(PA) ≤ O(log4 d log((log d)/δ)) · (opt`∞(A))2
Proof: Our mechanism with small expected `∞ noise simply runs L , O(log d) copies Mwe(x) and returns the
median answer for each coordinate. In other words, if yj denotes the outcome of the jth run of the mechanism
Mwe, then we set zi = median(y1i , . . . , yLi ).
By Markov’s inequality, we know that for each i, j, Pr[(yji −(Ax)i)2 ≥ kEMew,Ai ] ≤ 1k . Applying Chernoff bounds,
we conclude that Pr[(zi− (Ax)i)2 ≥ kEMew,Ai ] ≤ (2/k)CL for a constant C. By a union bound, we conclude that
Pr[‖z − Ax‖∞ ≥ O(log d) opt`∞(A)] ≤ d · ( 2k )CL. Taking L = Ω(log d) suffices to ensure that the integral of this
probability over k ∈ [4,∞) converges, giving a bound on the expected `∞ norm of the error.
The resulting mechanism is not necessarily (ε, δ)-differentially private any more. However, since its outcome
can be computed by postprocessing the outcome of L (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms, it is still (Lε, Lδ)-
differentially private. Scaling ε and δ by a factor of L, and substituting for β, we get the result. 
6.2 Approximating Hereditary Discrepancy
In this section we show that our optimal dense case mechanism implies a polylogarithmic approximation to hered-
itary discrepancy. In particular, the mechanism optimal for `22 error can be used to approximate `2 discrepancy,
and the mechanism optimal for `∞ error can be used to approximate `∞ discrepancy. The `∞ version of heredi-
tary discrepancy is NP-hard to approximate to within a factor of 3/2 (proof in appendix). Showing supeconstant
hardness for approximating any version of hereditary discrepancy, constant hardness for approximating `2 hered-
itary discrepancy, and determining whether hereditary discrepancy can be exactly computed in nondeterministic
polynomial time remain open problems.
Muthukrishnan and Nikolov [MN12] show that hereditary discrepancy gives a lower bound on the error of any
mechanism.
Theorem 25 ( [MN12], Corollary 1) There exist constants ε, δ such that the following holds: Let A be a d×N
matrix and M be an (, δ)-differentially private mechanism. Then
herdisc`∞(A) ≤ O(logN) · err`∞M (A)
Fix constants ε and δ satisfying Theorem 25. Thus the theorem implies that herdisc`∞(A) ≤ O(logN) ·opt`∞(A).
It is easy to see that for any positive semidefinite diagonal matrix P with tr(P 2) = 1, (herdisc`∞(A))2 ≥
herdisc`
2
2(PA): indeed for any S ⊆ [N ], there exists a coloring z supported on S such that ‖Az‖∞ ≤ herdisc`∞(A).
Since ‖PAz‖22 ≤ ‖Az‖2∞, the claim follows. Moreover, recall that herdisc`
2
2(PA) ≥ c · specLB(PA), for some
absolute constant c. Thus
specLB(PA) ≤ (herdisc`∞(A))2
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On the other hand, the mechanism of Theorem 24 satisfies
(err`∞Mew(A))
2 ≤ O(log4 d log((log d)/δ)) specLB(PA).
Thus we have
(herdisc`∞(A))2 ≤ O(log2N) err`∞Mew(A)
≤ O(log4 d log2N log((log d)/δ)) · specLB(PA)
We have sandwiched herdisc`∞(A)2 between two efficiently computable quantities that areO(log4 d log2N log log d)
apart. It follows that
Theorem 26 There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given a d×N real matrix A, outputs an O(log2 d logN√log log d)
approximation to herdisc`∞(A).
The description of this mechanismMew (which is specified by a distribution over O(log d) Gaussian noise addition
mechanisms) thus serves as an efficiently computable and verifiable witness to an upper bound on the hereditary
discrepancy of A.
We next give a constrcutive version of this result, by appealing to a result of Bansal [Ban10] that shows that
the discrepancy of any set system can be constructively upper bounded by O(log dN) times the hereditary vector
discrepancy. The vector discrepancy of a matrix A, denoted vecdisc(A) is defined as the smallest λ such that the
following semidefinite program is feasible:
SDP VecDisc: A ∈ Rd×m
a(i)V a(i)T ≤ λ ∀i ∈ [d]
Vjj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [m]
m∑
j=1
Vjj ≥ m/8 (20)
V  0
The hereditary vector discrepancy is simply hervecdisc(A) , maxS⊆[N ] vecdisc(A|S). We will show that given the
mechanism Mew of Theorem 24, we can construct for any S a solution to the SDP corresponding to S. We note
that the above SDP is a slight relaxation of the SDP used by Bansal: instead of the constraint Vjj = 1 for all j,
we simply require each Vjj to be at most one, and that the trace of V is Ω(m). It is easy to verify that [Ban10]
implies that:
Theorem 27 ( [Ban10]) Suppose that for a matrix A ∈ Rd×N and a λ ≥ 0, for every S ⊆ [N ] with rank(A|S) =
|S|, it is the case that the SDP 20 is feasible for A|S. Them there is polynomial time algorithm that finds a coloring
χ of [N ] with discrepancy at most O(λ log dN).
We consider a variant of the above SDP, where we drop the Vjj ≤ 1 constraint and require the trace of V to be
slightly larger:
SDP RelVecDisc: A ∈ Rd×m
a(i)V a(i)T ≤ λ ∀i ∈ [d]
m∑
j=1
Vjj ≥ m (21)
V  0
We first show that it suffices to satisfy the SDP 21.
Lemma 16 Suppose that for a matrix A ∈ Rd×N , for every S ⊆ [N ] with rank(A|S) = |S|, it is the case that
the SDP 21 is feasible for A|S and λ. Then for any S ⊆ [N ] with rank(A|S) = |S|, the SDP 20 is feasible for
A|S and 2λ.
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Proof: We construct a feasible solution to 20 by repeatedly using solutions to 21 for different values of the
restriction A|S . Fix an S ⊆ [N ] with |S| = m and let S0 = S. Let W 0 be the d ×m zero matrix indexed by
S ⊆ [N ]. Let V 0 be a solution to SDP 21 for A|S0 . Let γ0 = maxj V 0jj , and let V¯ 0 = V 0/2γ0. For each j, j′ ∈ S0,
set W 1jj′ = W
0
jj′ + V¯
0
jj′ . Finally we set S1 = S0 \ {j : W 1jj ≥ 14}.
Given Si such that |Si| ≥ m/2, we let V i be a feasible solution to the SDP for A|Si and set γi = maxj V ijj , and
V¯ i = V i/2γi. For each j, j
′ ∈ Si, set W i+1jj′ = W ijj′ + V¯ ijj′ . We update Si+1 = Si \ {j : W i+1jj ≥ 14}. We stop once|Si| falls below m/2, say in iteration L. It is easy to see that we delete at least one j from Si in each step, so
that this process converges.
We claim that WL is a feasible solution to SDP 20. Observe that WL is simply a a non-negative linear combination
of V i’s and hence is positive semidefinite. By definition of V¯ , each diagonal entry is at most 12 , so that the
definition of Si ensures that W
L
jj ≤ 34 < 1 for all j. Moreover, for each j ∈ S \ SL, the entry WLjj ≥ 14 , and there
are at least m/2 such j, so that the trace of WL is at least m/8 as required. Finally, a(i)WLa(i)T is simply the
sum
∑L−1
t=0
a(i)V ta(i)T
2γt
. Thus it suffices to show that
∑L−1
t=1 (2γt)
−1 ≤ 2. Note that tr(W t+1 −W t) = tr(V¯ t) ≥
(2γt)
−1|St| ≥ (2γt)−1m/2. It follows that m ≥ tr(WL) ≥
∑L−1
t=1 (2γt)
−1m/2 so that
∑L−1
t=1 (2γt)
−1 ≤ 2 as needed.
The claim follows. 
Finally, we describe how to use the mechanism Mew of Theorem 24 to construct a feasible solution to SDP 21.
Lemma 17 Suppose that for a matrix A ∈ Rd×N , we have an oblivious noise (ε, δ)-DP mechanism M such that
err`∞M (A) ≤ κ. Then for any S ⊆ [N ] with rank(A|S) = |S|, the SDP 21 is feasible for A|S with λ = Oε,δ(κ2).
Proof: Since an (ε, δ)-DP mechanism for A also yields an (ε, δ)-DP mechanism for any submatrix of A, we can
assume without loss of generality that S = [N ]. For a y ∈ Rd, let invA(y) , arg minx ‖Ax − y‖∞. Let Y be a
random variable distributed according toM(0) and let X = invA(Y ). Then by the properties of the mechanism
E[‖AX‖∞] ≤ E[‖AX − Y ‖∞ + ‖Y ‖∞] ≤ 2E[‖Y ‖∞] ≤ 2κ, since 0 is a possible value for invA(Y ), and we picked
X. Thus if we set V = E[XXT ], then a(i)V a(i)T ≤ 16κ2 for each i.
It remains to lower bound Vjj = E[(Xj)2] ≥ Var(Xj). Intuitively, if Var(Xj) was small, then Y gives too much
information about Xj , violating differential privacy. Formally, by differential privacy, the statistical distance
between M(0) and M(ej) is at most 2(ε + δ). Thus the distribution Y is close to Y + Aej . But it is easy to
check2 that invA(y+Aej) = invA(y) +ej . Thus the distribution X is close to X+ej . This in turn lower bounds
the variance of Xj by an absolute constant. Scaling V by a constant factor implies the result. Finally, we observe
that this proof can be easily made constructive. We can take polynomially many samples x1, . . . , xk and setting
V to the empirical estimate 1k
∑k
i=1 xix
T
i instead of E[XX
T ]. Truncating the distribution so as to reject any xi
with ‖Axi‖∞ ≥ d3κ or with ‖xi‖∞ ≥ d3 still preserves the required properties and allows us to use Chernoff
bounds to ensure that the empirical estimate satisfies the constraints up to a constant factor. 
7 Conclusions
We have presented near optimal mechanisms for any linear query for dense and sparse databases, under both
pure and approximate differential privacy. Our mechanisms are simple and efficient, and it would be instructive
to implement them so as to compare them with existing techniques.
Our work uses the hereditary discrepancy lower bound, which holds for small enough constant ε and δ. Since
our lower bounds do not get higher as δ gets smaller, the approximation ratio has an O(
√
log 1/δ) term in it.
We leave open the question of developing better lower bounding techniques, and better approximation ratios for
(ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms. Our work gives `22 bounds on the error. While we can translate those
bounds to `∞ error bounds for the dense case, we leave open the question of designing near optimal `∞ error
mechanisms in the sparse case.
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A Concentration of Log concave measures
The following measure concentration inequality is standard. We include a proof below for completeness. We start
by stating the Brunn-Minkowski inequality.
Theorem 28 Let µ be a log-concave measure on <d, let α, β ≥ 0 be numbers such that α + β = 1, and let
A,B ⊆ <d be measurable sets such that the set αA+ βB is measurable. Then
µ(αA+ βB) ≥ (µ(A))α(µ(B))β
This can be used to prove Borell’s lemma for arbitrary log concave distributions. We use the proof approach
presented in [Gia03].
Proof of Theorem 20: Observe that
<d \A ⊇ ( 2
t+ 1
)(<d \ tA) + t− 1
t+ 1
A.
Applying the Brunn-Minkowski inequality and rearranging proves the result. 
B From Concentration to Expectation
We repeatedly use the fact that a exponential or better bound on the upper tail implies a bound on the expectation.
For completeness, we give a quantitative version with a proof.
Lemma 18 Suppose that for some constants C, c1, c2, a random variable X satisfies: ∀α ≥ c1,Pr[X ≥ αC] ≤
exp(−α/c2). Then E[X] ≤ (c1 + c2)C.
Proof: Let Y = (X − c1C)/C. Then
E[Y ] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr[Y ≥ α] dα
≤
∫ ∞
0
exp(−α/c2) dα
= c2
The claim follows by linearity of expectation. 
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C Hardness of Approximating Hereditary Discrepancy
We show constant hardness of approximation herdisc`∞ . Strong inapproximability results were previously given
for discrepancy, in the `2 and `∞ versions, by Charikar, Newman, and Nikolov [CNN11].
Let us define
disc`∞(A) = min
x∈{0,1}n
‖Ax‖∞
Theorem 29 There exists a family of input matrices A ∈ {0, 1}m×n for which it is NP-hard to distinguish between
the two cases (1) herdisc`∞(A) ≤ 2 and (2) disc`∞(A) ≥ 3.
The proof of Theorem 29 is a straight-forward reduction from the 2-colorability problem for 3-uniform hyper-
graphs. A maximization version of this problem (i.e. maximize the number of bichromatic edges) is also known
as Max-E3-Set Splitting and is equivalent to NotAllEqual-SAT restricted to inputs with no negated variables.
Definition 2 A hypergraph H = (V,E), where E ⊆ 2V , is 2-colorable if and only if there exists a set T ⊆ V
such that for all e ∈ E, T ∩ e 6= e and T ∩ e 6= ∅. The set T is called a transversal of H.
Lemma 19 ( [Sch78]) There exists a family of 3-uniform hypergraphs such that deciding whether a hypergraph
in the family is 2-colorable is NP-complete.
Proof of Theorem 29: The reduction simply maps a 3-uniform hypergraph to its incidence matrix. I.e. for
a hypergraph H = (V,E), where V = {v1, . . . , vn} and E = {e1, . . . , em}, we create a m × n matrix A, where
Aij = 1 if vj ∈ ei and Aij = 0 otherwise. Observe that if H is 2-colorable, and this is witnessed by a transversal
T , then ‖(A|S)x‖∞ ≤ 2 for all S ⊆ [n] and for x defined by xi = +1 ⇔ vi ∈ T . On the other hand, if H is not
2-colorable, for any x ∈ {+1,−1}n we have ‖Ax‖∞ ≥ 3, since otherwise the set T = {vi : xi = +1} would be a
transversal. 
We note that Guruswami proved constant hardness of approximation for Max-E3-Set Splitting [Gur00]. In partic-
ular, he showed that it is NP-hard to distinguish 2-colorable 3-uniform hypergraphs from hypergraphs for which
any coloring with 2 colors leaves at least a 1/20 fraction of the edges monochromatic.
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